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Summary
The global innovation map is changing. Until a few years ago innovation activities
were concentrated in the US, Europe and Japan. Not anymore. The rising powers
of China, India and Brazil are encroaching on the innovation stronghold of the old
powers. This report explores how deep the change goes and how we can explain
it. Most of the literature explains this shift in innovation power by concentrating on
factors within the rising powers, such as their investment in high-level education,
their low labour cost, their big and expanding internal markets and others. This
report concentrates on explanatory factors that emanate from the old powers,
notably the organisational decomposition of the innovation process (ODIP). The
empirical focus is on the global value chains that link Brazilian auto and Indian
software suppliers with lead firms in the US and Europe. The report shows that
subsidiaries and independent suppliers in Brazil and India were involved in
advanced innovation capabilities: they engaged not only in ‘applied’ development,
but also in ‘systemic’ development of products and services. In other words, the
build-up of innovation capabilities goes further than is generally recognised. Most
of the report is then concerned with unravelling the processes through which this
occurs, showing that ODIP emanating from US and European lead firms has
knock-on effects within Brazil and India. The research also distinguishes between
different types of ODIP showing that the biggest organisational and geographical
changes occur when innovation and production activities are tightly integrated.
The resulting build-up of innovation capability is only partially visible in
conventional R&D indicators. The causal connection between ODIP in the old
powers and increase of innovation capabilities in the new powers is not one way.
The accumulation of innovation capabilities in the new powers increases the
possibilities for further rounds of ODIP in the old powers.
Keywords: innovation; outsourcing; knowledge flows; global value chain;
organisational decomposition; suppliers; Indian software industry; Brazilian auto
industry.
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1 Introduction
The new millennium is young but in its first decade it has already seen successive
global shifts of economic power: first in production power, then in financial power
and now also innovation power. This report concentrates on the latter but needs to
be seen in the context of the bigger picture.
1.1 Global shifts in economic power
The shift in economic power is clearest in the case of the manufacturing industry:
the United States and Western Europe have de-industrialised and China has
become ‘the workshop of the world.’ The Western services industry which initially
seemed safe then began to outsource to India, which has subsequently become
the world’s leading software producer. These trends began in the old millennium
but have consolidated in the new millennium. This shift in production power was
followed by a shift in financial power which occurred not gradually but in the frenzy
of the global financial crisis. The result is that Western states, being highly
indebted, have little room for manoeuvre to finance the restructuring of their
economies; and Western companies battle their way out of recession by seeking
their fortune in the emerging markets. By targeting these emerging markets, one of
the old powers – German industry – has been able to recover quickly. Otherwise,
the picture is one of relative stagnation in the United States and Western Europe
and continued rapid growth in the rising powers of China, India and Brazil. 
The speed and depth of this global economic transformation is historically
unprecedented. It would, however, remain incomplete if it did not include a build-
up in innovation capabilities in the rising powers. There was the expectation – in
the old powers – that they would keep the innovation jobs. In other words, letting
the manufacturing and services jobs go would be okay as long as the most
attractive jobs in terms of skill and income could be kept. Innovation activities
were considered the bedrock of Western prosperity. Indeed, until the turn of the
twenty-first century, innovation jobs were almost entirely concentrated in Western
Europe, the United States and Japan.
Not anymore. Innovation activities outside the borders of the old powers are
increasing, in particular in the rising powers of China, India and Brazil. Altenburg
et al. (2008) show that China and India have embarked on the transition from
production to innovation: the breakthrough is uneven and cutting edge innovation
remains rare but adaptive innovation is significant in an increasing number of
sectors. Equally important, innovation has not just occurred in technology but also
in organisation and business models (Zeng and Williamson 2007). Brazilian
innovations in the aircraft, energy and automobile industries have been
internationally recognised (Monitor Group 2008). Sustainable biofuels have
become the prevalent energy source for passenger cars in Brazil, as a result of
the collaboration between the Brazilian agriculture, fuel and auto industries. This
shift in innovation power, which is still in its early stages, is likely to continue
because the emerging markets are becoming the lead markets for innovating
companies. Western markets have not become irrelevant but are growing very
little, if at all. 
1 This ‘capability approach’ emerged in the course of a number of articles, notably Bell (1984), Lall
(1992), Bell and Pavitt (1995), Bell and Albu (1999), Figueiredo (2006), Ariffin and Figueiredo (2006). 
2 For an in-depth discussion of the problems of country classifications, see Harris, Moore and Schmitz
(2009).
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1.1.1 New realities – old language
These issues are big, complex and controversial. In order to have a tidy
discussion it helps to clarify concepts, in particular the notion of innovation power
and the grouping of countries. We find it useful to distinguish between production
capabilities and innovation capabilities. The former refers to using and adapting
existing knowledge. The latter refers to creating new knowledge and putting it to
productive use. This distinction, which draws on the work of Martin Bell and
colleagues,1 is problematic because knowledge adaptation can be considered
both part of the production, and of the innovation capabilities. Often there is a
continuum between the two, but there is no automatic continuum. On the contrary,
over recent decades the two have decoupled. While products and services made
in the rising powers conquered world markets, there was no corresponding
accumulation of innovation activities. They had production power but little
innovation power. This is now changing in some sectors and firms. In this report,
we are examining sectors and firms in which this is taking place. 
When it comes to the global redistribution of these capabilities, the public and
academic discourse is hampered by inadequate language. The old distinction of
developing–developed continues to dominate internationally but hinders
understanding. In continental Europe, the category of industrialised countries
continues to be popular even though much of their industry has disappeared. The
distinction of rich and poor countries remains more accurate because per capita
incomes continue to differ substantially but (rising) intra-country differences
between rich and poor regions is now the biggest concern, in particular in the
rising powers. Reference to OECD countries is not useful for our purposes since
the OECD includes now some of the emerging economies such as Korea, Mexico
and Turkey. This report cannot escape the problem of inadequate country
classification.2 This is why we tend to name the countries we are concerned with,
that is, Brazil and India on the one hand and the USA and Germany on the other.
However, to make the report more readable we also use occasionally the
language that is in common use, notably the contrast between old and new
powers, or declining and rising powers. 
1.1.2 Reasons for the global shifts in innovation power
While the different terminologies continue to confuse, it is clear that a global
economic power shift has occurred in recent years. This report concentrates on
the innovation dimension of this power shift. The recent literature points to a
number of factors which explain the emerging shift in the global distribution of
innovation activities. On the side of emerging economies, these include: 
z Big state and private investment in higher education 
z Low wages (compared with old powers) for highly educated workers
11
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z The return migration of engineers, scientists, and managers 
z The insertion of local firms in global value chains 
z The co-location (clustering) of local firms and support institutions in the
developing world
z The increasing significance of lead markets in Asia and Latin America
z Governments ‘trading market access for technology’
z Local enterprises circumventing intellectual property rights of foreign firms
z The enormous financial resources that government agencies and enterprises
can mobilise to buy technology or research teams.
The relevance of these factors varies between countries and sectors. Even if all of
them are considered they are unlikely to provide a sufficient explanation for the
build-up of innovation capabilities in the rising powers. The old powers contribute
to this build-up too. The most visible example is European and American firms
setting up R&D facilities in China, India or Brazil. There are also less visible ways
in which they contribute to the shift in innovation power. The main purpose of this
report is to show how this occurs. In order to do this, we provide a conceptual
framework for analysing these changes and detailed evidence from the auto and
software sectors, in particular the value chains which connect the USA and
Germany with India and Brazil.
Unpacking these connections is critical for understanding how the innovation
power shift occurs and how deep it goes. What are the dynamics at work and
what kind of innovation activities are affected? Public discussion – and much of
the academic debate – provides a picture of old powers battling against new
powers. This is misleading because some players operate on both sides of the
fence. Showing this in itself is not so difficult but unravelling the dynamics which
are then unleashed and tracing the outcome is difficult. This is what we are trying
to do: opening a window into a process which is beginning to change the global
division of labour and affect the global distribution of prosperity. Innovation jobs
tend to be highly skilled and attract high incomes, so their location has
ramifications also for those not directly interested in innovation itself. 
1.2 The organisational decomposition of the innovation process
The starting point for our investigation is the organisational decomposition of the
innovation process (ODIP) in the old powers (Schmitz and Strambach 2009). Over
the last decade a fundamental change has occurred in the way innovation is
organised. It tended to be concentrated at or near headquarters but is now much
more decentralised within the company. Equally significant, innovation activities
that used to be carried out in-house by innovating firms themselves are carried
out by independent suppliers of knowledge intensive business services (KIBS), or
are transferred to key suppliers. These organisational changes in themselves are
not new; they have attracted a fair amount of discussion in the literature (for
example, Chesbrough 2006; Coombs et al. 2003). There is, however, little
systematic discussion of how they affect the global division of innovation activities.
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This is in fact difficult to do because ODIP works in myriad ways. This report
seeks to capture some of the main ODIP effects and to show how they influence
the global shift of innovation activities. 
To get a grip on these changes we follow Schmitz and Strambach (2009 and
distinguish between:
z Decomposing the innovation process within organisations and between
organisations – or internal and external ODIP. 
z Delegating innovation to those who are primarily concerned with knowledge
creation and those who are primarily concerned with producing a good or service.
These distinctions give a matrix of four types of ODIP (set out in chapter 3). Each
type of ODIP has been going on within Western Europe and the USA for some
time and each type has been discussed in the literature. What is missing is an
investigation of how these ODIP types – on their own and in conjunction – affect
the build-up of innovation activities outside Western Europe and the USA, in
particular in the rising powers.
In principle it should become much easier for the latter to build up their innovation
capabilities. They can acquire not just licences or private individuals but buy entire
research centres or product development teams. Central corporate control over
the innovation process is much reduced and competitors from any part of the
world should find it much easier to target those bits of the innovation architecture
which they most need. Surprisingly, there is no systematic analysis of rising power
firms taking advantage of the organisationally decomposed innovation business in
the old powers. 
There is, however, increasing evidence of corporations headquartered in the old
powers taking the initiative. They have established their own R&D facilities in the
rising powers and they have commissioned innovation work to independent suppliers
in the rising powers (UNCTAD 2005; Ernst 2009). In other words, they have
engaged in cross-continental ODIP. In this report, we include these ODIP types
but also examine others. And most importantly, we examine the knock-on effects. 
1.2.1 The research questions
This report seeks to understand the dynamics which have been unleashed by
ODIP emanating from the old powers and the implications for the build-up of
innovation capabilities in the rising powers. It investigates in particular: 
z How has the global value chain been reorganised? How has the lead firm
altered the organisation of the innovation process? How has the division of
labour changed between old and rising powers? 
z What are the knock-on effects for organising the innovation process within the
rising powers? Is ODIP being replicated in the new powers? 
z What opportunities for building up innovation capabilities have been opened
for the rising powers? Under what conditions can they take advantage of these
opportunities? What kind of new innovation capabilities are emerging as a
result? Do they include advanced capabilities? 
13
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z How does the build-up of innovation capabilities in the rising powers affect
ODIP decisions in the old powers? Does it have an accelerating effect? Taking
the longer view, what directions of causality become visible? 
The report seeks answers to these questions by examining the auto industry of
Brazil and the software industry of India and the value chains which link them to
the USA and Europe. It shows how ODIP contributes to the shifts in innovation
power, discusses the limits of this process and reflects on whether the old powers,
having embarked on ODIP, are contributing to their own demise.
1.2.2 The value added
This study deals with a process of economic transformation which changes the
division of labour and relationships between companies in old and new powers.
They have been connected through global value chains for some time but the
reorganisation of innovation activities in these value chains is relatively recent.
Indeed, caution is needed in drawing conclusions because the changes are
recent. This does not mean that they have a short history. As we shall see later,
the new innovation capabilities built on previous production capabilities. How far
do we need to go back in time in order to understand what has happened
recently? We address this question in the concluding chapter of our report which
brings out the limitations of our research. 
A key task of this introductory chapter is to specify the value which this report
seeks to add to the current debate. The value added is as follows: 
a) Bringing together disparate but relevant strands of literature 
The report draws on and brings together two lines of research about globalisation
and innovation which have hitherto been disconnected: (i) work on the global
decentralisation of innovation (or at least of R&D) along investment-centred value
chains within MNC structures (Chen 2008; Hobday and Rush 2007; Marin and
Bell 2010; Saliola and Zanfei 2009), and (ii) research about upgrading in ‘arms-
length’ and trade-centred value chains (Ernst 2008; Giuliani et al. 2005; Morrison
et al. 2008; Schmitz 2007). We integrate these in our ODIP framework that links
the changing organisation of the innovation process with the spread of innovation
through these value chains. 
The report also connects two other literatures: the work on ‘open innovation’ which
prioritises the implications within and between the old powers (Chesbrough 2006;
Christensen et al. 2005; Cooke 2005; Simard and West 2006), and the research
on the build-up of innovation capabilities in the new powers (Ariffin and Figueiredo
2006; Bell 2006; Bell and Pavitt 1995; Figueiredo 2006). 
b) Conceptualisation
Despite the acknowledgment of increasing internationalisation of innovation, there
is a dearth of theoretical frameworks to inform research into this phenomenon.
Existing frameworks do not bring together the recent changes in both old and
rising powers and neither do they include reorganisation within multinational firms
as well as outsourcing to independent suppliers in global value chains. The
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analysis of the new geography of corporate innovation requires such a framework
in order to capture the redistribution of innovation activities across the globe, both
within and between firms.
As stated above, the starting point for this report is a new integrative concept for
analysing the reconfiguration of innovation in and across enterprises: the
organisational decomposition of the innovation process (Schmitz and Strambach
2009). We define ODIP broadly as the process by which firms shift elements of
their innovation processes from their headquarters to decentralised departments,
subsidiaries, research organisations and suppliers of products or knowledge-
intensive services.
c) Including the less visible processes 
In our empirical analysis of the different types of ODIP we do not just capture the
visible and measurable changes such as lead firms locating new R&D labs away
from headquarters in the rising powers. We also seek to throw light on the
commissioning of activities which are not explicitly focused on innovation but
bundled into work packages defined in terms of providing a product or service or
making a process work. We show how engagement in seemingly peripheral
innovation tasks opens up the path for encroaching onto more strategic tasks. And
solving the problem of one customer provides the platform for taking on more
demanding innovation work for other customers. For example, Indian software
companies, tasked with solving the specific problems of their US customers,
deliver innovations relevant to those problems and – in the process – open up
paths for developing new products or systems.
d) Including the knock-on effects 
The different types of decomposing the innovation process do not work in isolation
and they have knock-on effects. For example, as shown later, the subsidiary of an
auto-parts multinational company headquartered in Germany entrusts its Brazilian
subsidiary with producing a better system, and this subsidiary in turn commissions
research from local universities and involves local suppliers in developing and
making the new product. Three different types of ODIP end up working in
conjunction. Each type has been discussed in specialised literature providing
insights on specific mechanisms of reorganisation, but grasping the bigger picture
requires observing interdependencies and knock-on effects.
e) Directions of causality
Our main concern is to trace the implications of ODIP decisions made by European
or US lead firms and to examine how they contribute directly and indirectly to the
build-up of innovation capabilities in Brazil and India. This build-up in turn has
changed the landscape in which the European and US lead firms operate. It puts
them under pressure to innovate in cost-effective ways and delegate increasingly
sensitive parts of the innovation process to suppliers which benefited from previous
rounds of ODIP. In capturing the dynamics of the global reorganisation of
innovation activities, we show how our understanding of the directions of causality
changes once we examine the industries over a longer period of time. 
15
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1.2.3 Choice of sectors and locations
It is well established that the organisation of innovative activity differs across
sectors – both between and within manufacturing and services. Yet we
hypothesise that there are common changes across sectors. We therefore
selected for study a manufacturing and a services sector. Of course, they needed
to be important for both old and new powers. Automobile and software is a good
choice for the following reasons. 
z In the automotive industry, the offshoring of production functions to emerging
markets was already evident from the mid 1970s and increasingly so in the
1980s (Sturgeon et al. 2008). It is now an industry that has globally integrated
and effective value chains governed by so-called flagship firms (Ernst and Kim
2002). The organisational decomposition of the innovation process can
therefore be considered along a fully developed global value chain. 
z The globalisation of the software industry did not take off on a significant scale
until the 1990s. However, it is a human-capital-intensive industry characterised
by low transportation costs. It therefore carries a high potential for knowledge-
mobility (Athreye 2005; Commander et al. 2008; Rousseva 2008). New
clusters specialised in producing software have emerged, in particular in the
rising powers. 
This cross-sector comparative perspective is critical for gaining insights into
whether the organisational decomposition of innovation has similar or different
patterns in industries producing tangible and intangible goods. 
As regards the geographical focus, we have concentrated on clusters in Brazil
and India and the value chains which link them to lead firms in the USA and
Germany. The software cluster of Bangalore in India and the auto cluster of São
Paulo and other locations in Brazil seemed to be good candidates for our
research. If ODIP is relevant for the build-up of innovation activities one would
expect to find it here: 
z Greater São Paulo is Brazil’s main car producing region. Its car industry was
established by German and American companies much earlier than, for
example, in Asian regions like Shanghai. In Greater São Paulo, a well-
documented cluster emerged with substantial experience in building and
upgrading the production capabilities of local suppliers (Humphrey 2003;
Quadros 2004). Further clusters have emerged in other locations, notably in
Campinas in the state of São Paulo and in Caxias do Sul in the state of Rio
Grande do Sul. The latter specialises in trucks, the others more in passenger
cars. These clusters have strong production capabilities – strong by global
standards. The extent to which they have been able to accumulate innovation
capabilities is disputed in the literature – as discussed in chapter 2. 
z Bangalore, the capital of Karnataka state, has become a world-leading hub in
the global software industry with a high concentration of global software firms
and export-oriented local software service providers. The increasing
possibilities for off-shoring software production to low cost locations have
contributed to the changing geography of the IT industry and the development
of specialised software clusters such as Bangalore. Its main source of growth
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were exports – carried out by Indian and foreign-owned firms. Both benefited
from knowledge transfer via the international mobility of skilled people. This
occurred through ‘body shopping’, in particular in Silicon Valley, and through
the return of highly skilled migrants (Arora et al. 2008; Athreye 2005; Bhatnagar
2006; Chaminade and Vang 2008; Commander et al. 2008; Saxenian 2004). 
In assessing how ODIP affected these clusters, it is important to keep in mind in
which respect they were similar or different in their starting conditions. The critical
similarity is that – when we started our empirical investigation – both had attained
world class standards in production capabilities. In the course of the research we
then found substantial evidence of innovation capabilities in both cases – evidenced
in later chapters. This provides a good basis for investigating how ODIP influences
the build-up of innovation capabilities.
The following differences need to be kept in mind when comparing the two cases: 
z The Brazilian auto industry produces mainly for the internal market and the
Indian software industry mainly for external markets. 
z The key players within the Brazilian auto industry are the subsidiaries of
multinational companies; the main players within the Indian software industry
are Indian-owned companies even though foreign subsidiaries are also
present and important. 
z Automobiles are complex products consisting of many (sub-) systems and
produced in long value chains. Most software also consists of (sub-) systems
but the value chains tend to be shorter. 
These differences influence the way in which the decomposition of the innovation
process unfolds. The report will show whether this leads to different outcomes in
terms of the depth of innovation capabilities in Brazil and India. 
1.3 The structure of the report
The report is structured as follows: chapter 2 provides a brief review of the
literature on the Brazilian automotive and Indian software industry. It summarises
what we already know about the issues raised in this report and provides context
for further empirical analysis.
Chapter 3 provides the conceptual and theoretical basis of the paper. It sets out
the ODIP framework that guides the empirical research. In doing so, it draws on
insights from the International Business (IB) literature focused on multinational
enterprises and their activities in emerging markets (Birkinshaw and Hood 1998;
Hobday and Rush 2007; Narula and Dunning 2010; Saliola and Zanfei 2009) and
on the Global Value Chain (GVC) literature (Gereffi et al. 2005; Giuliani et al.
2005; Morrison et al. 2008; Schmitz 2007). It also shows how this paper feeds into
the debate about the new geography of innovation. Chapter 4 then explains the
methodology adopted for the research presented in this paper, including the
sampling strategy and the methods of data collection.
The remainder of this report sets out the empirical results. Before showing how
ODIP has affected the build-up of innovation capabilities, it provides evidence that
17
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substantial innovation capabilities exist – since this remains a controversial topic.
To this end, it draws on conventional indicators of innovation capabilities and on
our own primary material. Chapter 5 shows that both our sample firms in the auto
industry of Brazil and the software industry of India have been able to make the
transition from production to innovation. Focusing on the Brazilian and Indian end
of global value chains, we find that both have not only demonstrated capabilities
of producing to international standards, but they have also begun to build up
significant innovation capabilities, including some capabilities for advanced
technology development and high-level systemic development. 
Chapter 6 begins the discussion of how ODIP contributes to this build-up of
capabilities. It shows how ODIP took different forms in the two industries. This is
done by examining (global-scale) cross-border decomposition as practiced by lead
firms that were connected to the innovation ‘events’ in Brazil and India. It shows
that knowledge creation and learning have become processes that are
increasingly segmented across geographies through multi-layered corporate
networks that utilise and combine different types of ODIP. We illuminate how new
strategies and practices adopted by lead firms have created new ‘spaces’ for
subsidiaries and suppliers in India and Brazil. However, we also discuss the
boundaries of these spaces. We highlight in this section the typically strong
connection between production and innovation activities in both cases. This is an
important but often neglected dimension of the new geography of knowledge.
Innovation networks are being built on top of global production networks; they are
not replacing them. 
Chapter 7 examines in more detail the implications of ODIP for ‘local suppliers’.
Comparing the two cases, it shows that ODIP takes different paths but the results
in terms of building up innovation capabilities are the same. In the automotive
case, there is a sequential pattern of intra-firm cross-border ODIP first, followed by
inter-firm country-internal ODIP. The local auto-parts suppliers in Brazil tend to link
up with the Brazilian subsidiaries of multinational assemblers or first-tier suppliers.
They are not directly involved in the initial ODIP in Europe or the USA. In India,
local suppliers typically deal directly with buyers located in Europe or the USA and
are directly affected by their ODIP decisions. In spite of the different paths, the
outcome for local suppliers is the same. In both cases, they become deeply involved
in co-design. In both cases, this has occurred through a transformation of relationships
with their customers. Information flows have become thicker, bi-directional, and
include elements of tacit knowledge. In both cases, local suppliers have built up
significant innovation capabilities – thus using the opportunities afforded by ODIP. 
Chapter 8 emphasises that the accumulation of innovation capabilities is not an
automatic outcome. It only happens if suppliers make the corresponding
investment in people, equipment, organisation and relationships. In our sample
firms, it was further aided by the leveraging of competencies across customers.
The suppliers worked with and learnt from various customers, using the
knowledge acquired in one chain to advance in another chain. Such capabilities of
learning from external customers and making the corresponding internal
investments could come to fruition because ODIP provided new opportunities but
they did not originate in ODIP. They came from a history of learning and acquiring
skills through various channels. The chapter therefore emphasises first, that there
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were multiple contributors to the deepening of innovation capability and second,
that although ODIP created space for innovation, the effective exploitation of that
space required significant new effort on behalf of suppliers.
Chapter 8 then increases the timescale and asks questions about the directions of
causality between our two main variables: ODIP and the build-up of innovative
capability. The previous chapters examine how the deepening of innovation
capabilities in the two industries in Brazil and India was influenced by ODIP
emanating from Europe and the USA. Taking the longer view, one can ask to what
extent and how this ODIP was influenced by the accumulation of capabilities in India
and Brazil. The direction of causation is not easy to establish. There was a push
from lead firms in the USA and Europe, but this push was only possible because
certain capabilities had already been acquired by Indian and Brazilian suppliers.
Similarly, it is likely that the recent deepening of innovation capabilities by suppliers
affects the ODIP decisions of their customers. Suppliers do not constitute a passive
reservoir waiting to be approached by lead firms from Europe or the USA. Seen in
conjunction, suppliers accelerate the pace of change; they change the landscape in
which lead firms operate by increasing the options for new rounds of ODIP. In sum,
the capabilities acquired by suppliers change the options available to lead firms. 
The final chapter does two things: first, it brings together the main findings from
this research and specifies the key advances made in relation to the literature.
This includes a discussion of why we observe a more substantial shift in
innovation power than most of the literature: is it because our research is more
recent or is it because of the way we carried out research? 
Second, it reflects on the future. This is done by setting out two scenarios: 
z The first scenario is co-evolution of the old innovating regions in Europe and
the USA and the new innovating regions in Brazil and India. Changes in one
bring about changes in the other and vice versa. The division of labour
changes, their specialisation profiles change but both regions move forward.
The process is painful but the result is win-win. 
z The second scenario also stresses intense interaction but the result is that one
side loses and the other one wins. The loser is the old region which sees a
decline in innovation jobs and economic prosperity. The winner is the new region
which sees a rise in innovation jobs and prosperity. ODIP plays a critical role in
this process. ODIP leads to a hollowing out of the innovation capabilities of the
old regions and a corresponding deepening of innovation capabilities in the new
regions. In other words, by embarking on ODIP, the old regions are digging their
own grave. 
Both scenarios are plausible but both need an analytical refinement. The economic
region as a unit of analysis is not sufficient. We need to add the globally mobile
enterprise as a unit of analysis. It relocates – or splits operations and locations –
as new opportunities arise. The enterprise which was doing well in the old region
might be the same as the enterprise doing well in the new region. Capitalism has
become truly global. The innovation business is the last bastion of regional
embeddedness. ODIP has started to erode this. We are moving closer to a world in
which the innovative enterprise has no homeland. Are such homeless enterprises
the real winners in this era of global shifts in innovation power? Only time will tell. 
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2 What do we know from the
existing literature?
This short chapter pulls together the findings from the literature on the Brazilian
automotive industry and the Indian software industry. It addresses three issues:
(i) whether suppliers and subsidiaries have acquired (advanced) innovation
capability, (ii) how lead firms organise the innovation process and (iii) how local
suppliers are included in the lead firms’ innovation networks. The chapter is
concerned with bringing together the empirical findings from our two industries;
conceptual issues are discussed in chapter 3. 
2.1 The automotive industry in Brazil 
The attainment of innovation capabilities in the Brazilian auto industry is a
controversial topic. Much of the early literature on Brazilian innovation activities in
the automobile value chain had a pessimistic view. For instance, Humphrey,
Lecler and Salerno (2000: 11) found that while process-engineering skills required
in the Brazilian automotive industry had risen because of increasing quality
requirements and product complexity, design and product-engineering skills were
less in demand. They expected that ‘follow sourcing’ and its match ‘follow design’
would become generalised practices in the motor industry, crowding out product-
engineering capabilities in Brazilian owned OEMs. Similarly, Cassiolato et al.
(2001) studied the Fiat cluster in the state of Minas Gerais. They sustained that,
following internationalisation of the industry, ‘R&D activities have almost
disappeared in the cluster’ and that the product development and engineering
staff of Fiat was substantially reduced (Cassiolato et al. 2001: 9).
In contrast to this pessimistic view, an optimistic view emerged from other
research which showed that – since the late 1990s – some leading multinational
companies producing cars in Brazil have bet on locally developed products which
were more aligned to the needs of local markets (Quadros and Queiroz 2001;
Carneiro-Dias et al. 2003). Brazilian subsidiaries of multinational assemblers,
particularly those with long experience in manufacturing, have enlarged R&D
mandates and have stepped up their product-related technological activities. They
specialise in designs relevant for their ‘own’ market and at the same time play an
active role in the lead firm’s global network. There is now substantial evidence of
lead firms re-locating Product Development activities to Brazil and participating in
their corporations’ R&D networks (Consoni and Quadros 2006; Quadros and
Consoni 2009; Dias et al. 2011). This shift, however, has been primarily focused
on development and experimental activities, rather than on new technological
research (Quadros and Consoni 2009). In parallel, Sturgeon et al. (2008), studying
the motor vehicle value chain, recognised that design and engineering (D&E)
remained for a long time concentrated in clusters around lead firm headquarters,
but have recently been moved to new growth markets. 
Compared to research on assembly lead firms and their innovative activities in
Brazil, there is much less work on auto-parts suppliers. Few studies have explored
how the global reorganisation of the auto industry has affected local suppliers’
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scope to build up their own innovation activities. Here the pessimistic view
prevails. For example, Salerno et al. (2003), though recognising that local vehicle
design and development can give local enterprises greater opportunities to
participate in design, suggest that such potential was rarely realised. ‘The
transnational companies that have a hegemonic role in the upper layers of the
chain do the bulk of the auto-parts design activities’ (Salerno et al. 2003: 14).
According to Salerno and his colleagues’ findings, Brazilian owned suppliers
played only a minor role in product design and engineering activities although they
had a somewhat increased role in process design. Indirectly they supported the
rival hypothesis, namely that multinational assemblers encourage the big suppliers
in their European and American home market to locate to countries such as Brazil
(Humphrey 2003). If such ‘follow sourcing’ practices are adopted, the assembler
subsidiary would then tend to reproduce supplier choices made by the parent
company. Our later empirical chapters will follow this up and show whether this
actually happened (see in particular chapter 7). 
2.2 The Indian software industry
Most literature on the Indian software industry has also been pessimistic with
regard to the build-up of innovative capability. The dominant argument is that
Indian software firms have become strong in production/execution capabilities but
have remained weak in innovation capability (Arora et al. 2008; Dossani 2006).
The emphasis on ‘productive’ capacity is particularly strong in the works of
D’Costa (see, for example, 2006, 2009). He argues that the rootedness of India’s
competitive advantage in low labour costs gave rise to ‘extensive growth’, the
linear expansion of the work force, without a corresponding increase in the
deepening of skills. Indian firms tended to focus on the lower value-added stages
of the software-development cycle in which learning opportunities were limited
(see also Tschang 2005). However, like in the case of the Brazilian auto
component suppliers, some recent studies emphasise the attainment of process
capability. Athreye (2005) highlights the formation of strong process capabilities
and organisational capabilities which were necessary to exploit the opportunity
that arose with offshore outsourcing in the 1990s.
Research on lead firms in the software case is more ambiguous with regard to the
relocation of innovative activities to India. Most research has argued that European
and American lead firms have sought to centralise innovative activities in-house or
close to home: their core innovative activities tended to be non-globalised and
bound to their home locations due to the importance of tacit knowledge
(Chaminade and Vang 2008; D’Costa 2002; Wibe and Narula 2002). However,
some recent research on MNCs has identified an increasing tendency to globalise
R&D and encourage ‘subsidiary initiatives’ (Asakawa and Som 2008; Krishnan
2006). Similarly, some recent studies focused on global buyers and their
outsourcing practices have identified new tendencies of ‘strategy evolution’ with an
increased emphasis on the outsourcing of high value, knowledge creating activities
and innovative functions (Jensen 2009; Lewin et al. 2008; Maskell et al. 2007).
There have been only limited insights, however, with regard to the types of
innovative activities that are outsourced. And little is known about how such
innovative processes and functions compare to those in the manufacturing sectors.
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Subcontracting linkages between multinational subsidiaries and locally owned
firms seem to be rare. Even when multinationals have substantial supplier
networks in India, these tend to be coordinated by headquarters in Europe or the
USA (Mytelka 2000). However, local firms seem to have benefited from substantial
knowledge spillovers from multinationals which contributed to human capital
formation in the industry (Patibandla and Petersen 2002). These linkages have
primarily been indirect arising from the high levels of labour mobility in the
industry: software professionals frequently alternate between employment in MNC
subsidiaries and locally owned firms. Fewer studies have addressed the issue of
‘innovation push’ in direct linkages between foreign and locally owned firms in
India. While recent literature suggests, as mentioned, that offshore outsourcing
has extended from simple services to innovation activities (Engardio and Einhorn
2005; Lynn and Salzman 2007; Maskell et al. 2007), the recorded changes on the
demand side have not been followed up with systematic assessments of the
changes and consequences on the supply side. 
The need to redress this gave rise to the research presented in this report. To
understand what is going on, we need to understand the neglected issue of lead
firms decentralising innovative activity to emerging economies and the resulting
interactions between subsidiaries and independent suppliers. The next two
chapters present the concepts and methods used in our research. 
3 Analytical framework 
The question which drives this project is how ODIP emanating from the old powers
influences the build-up of innovation capabilities in the rising powers. We seek to
understand the dynamics at work. This is not easy because there is no role model we
can follow. There are, however, various pockets of literature which we can draw on. 
There is a recent literature on the changing geography of innovation (Bruche
2009; Ernst 2009; Fifarek and Veloso 2010; Mudambi 2008) but the organisational
decomposition does not play a central role in these studies. The latter is, however,
the central concern in the management literature on ‘Open Innovation’
(Chesbrough 2003, 2006; Simard and West 2006). This literature discusses the
changing division of labour within and between the old powers, but has little to say
about the accumulation of innovation capabilities in the rising powers which –
being latecomers – have different starting conditions. This is why we draw on the
literature concerned with learning and capability formation in latecomer economies
(Ariffin 2000; Bell 2006, 2007; Figueiredo 2006). 
These bodies of work are all helpful but what we need most is to understand the
connections between them. These connections in turn are not uncharted territory,
there is an international business literature concerned with the division of labour
and distribution of capabilities between parent firms and subsidiaries in multinational
firms (Birkinshaw and Hood 1998; Gerybadze and Reger 1999; Hobday and Rush
2007; Narula and Dunning 2010; Saliola and Zanfei 2009). And there is the value-
chain literature that investigates how the relationships between global lead firms
and local suppliers influence the build-up of capabilities in the emerging economies
(Ernst 2008; Gereffi et al. 2005; Schmitz 2007). 
3 For an overview of the literature concerned with particular bits of the decomposition process, see
Schmitz and Strambach (2009). 
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Building on these rich but disparate literatures, Schmitz and Strambach (2009)
suggest a framework that puts the organisational decomposition of the innovation
process (ODIP) centre stage and provides a basis for integrating the analysis of
changes that have hitherto been looked at separately. 
The ODIP framework has two dimensions. The first one refers to decomposition
within and between organisations. The distinction is between intra- and inter-
organisational – or to keep the language simple: internal and external. The
second refers to the extent to which innovation is integrated with production of
goods and services. Innovation can be delegated to those who are primarily
concerned with knowledge creation and have only a loose connection with the
production of goods and services. Or it can be delegated to those who are tightly
connected to the production of goods and services and have the latter as their
primary function. The former tend to concentrate on research, the latter
concentrate more on product and process development; often they include
innovation activities bundled into work packages defined in terms of providing a
product or service. 
The above two dimensions lead to the four different ODIP types identified in
Table 3.1. Note that these are ideal types. In practice, there is a continuum
between them. Nevertheless, they help us to make sense of the myriad of
changes occurring in the real world. As will be shown later – when we apply these
categories to ‘our sectors’ – they need adjustment and qualification, but they help
us to identify the organisational changes which are most common and the
sequence in which they occur. We also want to see them in conjunction and
observe how they unfold within and across the borders of firms and countries.3
The types of ODIP, set out in Table 3.1 have been going on within Western
Europe and the USA for some time, in particular during the last decade. And as
indicated before, there is literature on each of these four types of ODIP. We want
Table 3.1 Types of ODIP
Intra- and 
Inter-firm
Connection Internal External
of production 
and innovation
Loosely connected Type 1 Type 3
Decentralising the R&D Commissioning research  
Department from universities or other 
Setting up Internal organisations
Knowledge Communities
Closely connected Type 2 Type 4
Delegating the development Engaging suppliers of 
of products or processes to products or services in 
subsidiaries developing new parts,  
Setting up Internal Centres of services or processes
Excellence 
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to find out how this organisational decomposition affects the build-up of innovation
activities outside Western Europe and the USA, in particular in the rising powers.
In order to do so, it helps to distinguish between four steps – set out in Figure 3.1.
ODIP takes place initially within the old powers (step 1), then extends from the old
powers directly to the rising powers (step 2), which produces knock-on effects
within the rising powers (step 3), which in turn affects ODIP decisions of the old
powers (step 4). We cannot examine each step in equal depth. For some steps,
we have strong evidence, for others we have tentative evidence and for some
aspects we have no evidence but can offer informed hypotheses. 
As mentioned before, there is a wealth of literature on how ODIP unfolds and
spreads within the old powers. We do not seek to add to this literature, but focus
mainly on the subsequent steps. In examining step 2 – the extension of ODIP from
Europe and the USA to India and Brazil – we focus on the delegation of innovative
activities to subsidiaries and suppliers. We seek to identify India and Brazil’s new
spaces for innovation – including the nature and boundaries of these spaces. 
Step 3 involves examining how ODIP has been replicated within the rising powers.
In other words, it examines how the changes in the division of labour – involving
rises in the innovation mandate – extend further down the value chain to first and
second tier suppliers of products and knowledge services. Most critically, we are
interested in how these dynamics affect the build-up of innovation capabilities in
Brazil and India. We are particularly interested in how advanced these innovation
capabilities are and under what conditions they arise. By including step 4 we
explore whether a reverse causality kicks in – higher innovation capabilities in
Brazil and India accelerating ODIP decisions in Europe and the USA. 
Figure 3.1 ODIP from old to new powers
ODIP within the old powers
Feedback
effects
Knock-on effects within the rising powers
Extension of
ODIP from old to
rising powers
1
4
3
2
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This is an ambitious agenda and the attribution problem makes it impossible to
quantify causal connections. We can, however, provide new insights into why and
how innovation power is shifting from the old to the new powers and what kind of
innovation capabilities are included. The next chapter sets out how we proceeded
in the empirical research. 
4 Research design and methods 
This report examines and compares ODIP and its implications in two sectors. The
reasons for comparing a manufacturing and a services sector and the choice of
sectors and locations were explained in the introductory chapter. This chapter
explains the sampling of firms and the collection of data. 
4.1 The selection of firms
Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 show the main ‘generic’ firm types from which firms were
selected for detailed study.
The main differences between the two industries in this respect is that greater value
chain segmentation in the auto sector has led to there being multinational suppliers
that mirror the geographical pattern of MNC assemblers (Quadros 2009). Hence,
there are two types of MNC structures in this industry: MNC assemblers and
respective subsidiaries and MNC suppliers and respective subsidiaries. Note also
that independent Brazilian suppliers tend to have direct linkages with the Brazilian
subsidiaries of MNCs rather than the MNC parent firm in Europe or the USA but
there are exceptions (which we have studied). In the software industry, the separation
of MNCs into two segments is not feasible. There is less value chain segmentation
and the industry itself is constituted of ‘specialised suppliers’ (Pavitt 1984).
We grouped the firms according to Table 4.1 and Table 4.2, but we did not give
equal emphasis to all of these types of firms in the two sector studies. The
criterion for selecting firms was purposeful sampling (Yin 2002). The logic of this
Table 4.1 Firm types in the auto case
Intra-firm value chain Inter-firm value chain
Europe/USA MNC Auto MNC Supplier Global Auto Assembler or Component 
Assembler Supplier
Brazil MNC Assembler MNC Supplier Independent OEM Supplier
Subsidiary Subsidiary
Table 4.2 Firm types in the software case
Intra-firm value chain Inter-firm value chain
Europe/USA MNC Software Producer Global Software Customer 
India MNC Software Subsidiary Independent Software Supplier
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type of sampling was to select information-rich cases that could reveal insights
about the general decomposition of innovation, illuminate different types and
aspects of ODIP, and reveal insights with regard to the possible implications. 
In the auto case study, we examined firms of the following types:
z Multinational assemblers’ subsidiaries in Brazil
z Multinational OEM suppliers’ subsidiaries in Brazil
z Local OEM suppliers.
In the software case study, we examined firms of the following types:
z Multinational software producers’ subsidiaries in Bangalore
z Global buyers sourcing software services from India
z Local export oriented software suppliers.
The samples in the auto and software cases are shown in Table 4.3 and 4.4
respectively. We gave preference to firms headquartered in Germany in order to
be able to check and trace connections with colleagues who had collected
information in Germany. 
Table 4.3 Firm sample – auto case
Type No Description
Multinational assemblers’ 2 One North American car assembler with advanced 
subsidiaries in Brazil relocation policy: General Motors (GM); One German 
truck assembler: Volkswagen Trucks and Buses 
(VW T&B) 
Multinational OEM 4 Three German systems/component global producers 
suppliers’ subsidiaries with a strong profile in Brazil (supplying the above 
in Brazil assemblers): Robert Bosch (fuel systems division), 
Mahle (engine components division), ZF Sachs (clutch 
linings and friction materials division); One North 
American systems/component supplier (which is a ‘risk-
sharing partner’ to VW T&B): ArvinMeritor
Local OEM suppliers 8 Four Brazilian companies, which are suppliers to at 
least one of the foreign firms: Sifco, Sabó, Arteb, and 
Fras-le; two recently established suppliers stemming 
from the ArvinMeritor and Brazilian Randon group 
partnership and also suppliers to VW T&B: Master and 
Suspensys; One supplier established in the 1980s in 
the engineering industry which has diversified into 
auto-parts: Lupatech; One is a small supplier which has 
developed with support from Bosch: Letande
Note: Further details about these firms are given in Quadros (2009).
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4.2 Data collection
The data for this research comes from the usual secondary sources and from
interviews carried out in India and Brazil (Quadros 2009 and Lema 2009b). We also
draw on interviews and correspondence with buyers/lead firms in OECD countries
and on data on the German auto and software industries collected mainly by our
colleagues Philipp Oswald (2008) and Simone Strambach (Strambach and Klement
2010; Strambach and Dieterich 2011). Whenever possible we seek to bring together
the view from above (the lead firm perspective) and the view from below (the
supplier perspective), but our data on the latter is stronger than on the former.
The interviews concentrated on innovation events, which were important for the
evolution of the firm and required strong innovation effort in Brazil or India.
Innovation events are milestones at which the firm is challenged to demonstrate
its maximum capabilities. Examining several innovation events makes it possible
to assess the firm’s progress in terms of building up innovation capabilities. 
Interviews were based on semi-structured questionnaires and sought to assess
the technical and commercial ties between customers/parent firms and suppliers
and the firms’ ability to rise to the challenges. A combination of in-depth interviews
and site observations were used as a means to collect first-hand evidence. We
interviewed senior managers with direct responsibilities for aspects of innovation
in the firms. Examples include senior engineering managers, product centre
managers or supply chain managers, senior managers for particular product
and/or country markets and similar managers in suppliers of equipment or
Table 4.4 Firm sample – software case
Type No Description
Multinational companies 6 Four German MNCs: Robert Bosch Engineering and 
(MNCs) with subsidiaries Business Solutions (RBEI); Siemens Information 
in Bangalore Systems Limited (SISL), Siemens Communications 
Systems (SCS) and SAP Labs India. Two non-German 
MNCs which acquired ‘local’ firms in our sample during 
the course of our research: Nokia/Symbian and HP/EDS.
Global buyers sourcing 3 Three global buyers that initiated substantial 
software services from outsourcing projects/relationships with software 
India suppliers in Bangalore: Nokia, Passalong Networks, 
and Volvo IT. 
Independent software 8 Four multi-domain software suppliers (Infosys, 
Suppliers in India MindTree, MphasiS and Wipro), two suppliers of 
outsourced product development services (Aztecsoft 
[now MindTree] and Aditi), and two suppliers of 
engineering services (Sasken) and testing services 
(RelQ, now HP).
Note: The sample includes lead firms interviewed jointly by Rasmus Lema, Philipp Oswald
and Simone Strambach as well as firms interviewed by Lema for his doctoral research
(Lema 2009b). Complementary information about the MNC firms is available in Oswald
(2008). The three global buyers were chosen for this paper as indicative of a larger buyer
sampled examined in-depth elsewhere (Lema 2010). The analysis of the software
suppliers draws on Lema (2009b) but does not include supplier firms that are focused on
made-in-India (MIP) packaged software products. 
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knowledge-intensive services. These respondents were particularly important as
sources of detailed information about the organisational structure of the innovation
process (the different elements of the process, how they are divided across
enterprises and how they are coordinated), and how this had changed over time.
The information obtained in interviews was complemented with information from
company reports, marketing material, websites and press reports. 
Given the difficulty of obtaining reliable primary information for this analysis of
change, the timeframe was limited to five years. However, in each case, this
primary analysis of change was embedded in the use of secondary material
throwing supplementary light on longer periods of change.
5 Innovation activity in the Brazilian
auto and Indian software industries
The enormous production capacity of the Brazilian motor industry is well-known,
but there is less knowledge about its engineering and design capabilities.
Similarly, the fast growth of the Indian software industry is widely acknowledged,
but whether this contains significant innovation is unclear. This chapter seeks to
answer this question for both industries. Before examining how ODIP contributed
to the build-up of innovation capabilities, it helps to show the existence of such
capabilities. This is particularly important since most of the literature – summarised
in chapter 2 – is sceptical in this respect. 
The chapter is based on both secondary and primary sources. It starts by drawing
on secondary data to examine conventional innovation indicators – R&D spending
and patent filings – as a backdrop for the further analysis. It then zooms in on the
firms in our samples, examining the changes in their activities and the capabilities
which they demonstrated in the sampled innovation events. 
5.1 Conventional indicators
What do the conventional indicators tell us about the breakthrough to advanced
innovation capability in the Brazilian auto and Indian software industries? This
brief subsection examines the available evidence. 
5.1.1 Brazilian automotive industry 
In recent years, the R&D intensity of the automobile industry (including automakers
and auto-parts suppliers) has increased faster than in the Brazilian manufacturing
industry as a whole. As shown in Table 5.1, between 2000 and 2008, the auto
industry spending on R&D grew by more than six times, reaching R$3.4 billion in
2008 (equivalent to approximately US$ 2 billion in 2010). R&D spending by the
Brazilian manufacturing industry as a whole grew approximately three times in the
same period. In 2008, the technological intensity, that is, the ratio of R&D
expenses to net sales in the automotive industry was 1.65 per cent (up from 1 per
cent in 2000). The share of the auto industry R&D spending in total industrial R&D
spending more than doubled from 2000 to 2008, accounting for approximately one
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quarter of the total R&D in the manufacturing industry. However, it is important to
add that assemblers account for 80 per cent of the spending on R&D.
Arguably, the R&D activity measured by this innovation survey primarily reflects
product and process development (D rather than R). Furthermore, these numbers
primarily express the expansion of product development units in the assemblers
rather than in OEM component suppliers. Indeed, the ratio of R&D personnel with
university education/total employment in the Brazilian auto-parts industry, in 2008,
was 0.96 per cent which was above the average ratio for the Brazilian
manufacturing industry (0.62 per cent), but substantially below the 4 per cent ratio
for the assemblers segment of the automobile industry. However, the fieldwork
data – see Table 5.2 – indicate that most component suppliers in our sample (both
foreign and locally owned) have ratios of R&D staff to total staff that are
substantially higher than those of the Brazilian auto-parts industry overall. 
With regard to output indicators, the patent data indicates that, in the group of 12
supplier firms investigated, the majority of firms report patenting activity –
irrespective of ownership being foreign or national. Table 5.3 shows that eight out
of the 12 sample suppliers have undertaken patenting activity in recent years.
Table 5.1 R&D spending in the Brazilian automobile and manufacturing
industries
2000 2003 2005 2008
Automotive industry
Total R&D (R$ million) 549 1,363 1,900 3,384
Total R&D/sales (%) 1 1.6 1.4 1,65
Manufacturing industry
Total R&D (R$ million) 4.336 5.739 7.979 12.386
Total R&D/sales (%) 0.8 0.6 0.7 0,7
R&D auto/ R&D total industry (%) 13 26 24 27
Source: Quadros (2009) and PINTEC/IBGE (Brazilian Innovation Survey). 
Note: Total R&D spending comprises external R&D and outsourced R&D.
Table 5.2 R&D staff with university education in sample firms, 2006/7
Firm R&D Staff Total staff Ratio
ArvinMeritor 24 1.000 2.4%
Bosch 250 8.250 3%
Mahle Metal Leve 150 8.000 1.8%
ZF Sachs 16 - -
Arteb 72 1.200 6.0%
Lupatech/Steelinject 14 608 2.3%
Sabó 65 3.316 2%
Fras-le 30 2.000 1.5%
Freios Master 11 600 1.8%
Letande 9 272 3.3%
Sifco 20 2.300 0.9%
Suspensys 22 2.000 1.1%
Source: Interviews.
4 Drawing on a NASSCOM database, the survey was undertaken in 2010 in eight Indian cities with
substantial software service activity. The survey resulted in a sample of 325 completed questionnaires,
which was a response rate of 24 per cent. The 325 firms in the survey equate to 23.85 to per cent of
firms registered in the NASSCOM database.
5 Note that our study has not made the distinction between Indian MNCs and standalone firms, although
several of the sampled firms would fall under the former category as per their overseas investments
(see section 8.1.2)
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5.1.2 Indian software industry 
Conventional R&D indicators for the Indian software industry are notoriously
scarce. Table 5.4 shows that more than 60 per cent of the firms in the Indian
software service sector engaged in R&D activities in 2010.4 This survey covered
headquarters of Indian MNCs, subsidiaries of foreign MNCs in India and
standalone firms acting as independent suppliers.5 The table shows that MNC
headquarters in India had the highest propensity to undertake R&D (78 per cent
reporting in-house R&D units). This is marginally higher than for the MNC
subsidiaries (it was 75 per cent). In terms of Indian standalone firms without global
operations (other than exports), 46 per cent had R&D departments. Data on R&D
intensity – i.e. the degree to which R&D departments incur real expenditures – is
slightly older. A survey of 119 software firms conducted in 2004 found that the
R&D costs as a percentage of total costs in Indian software services firms were
3.5 per cent, but it was 15 per cent in software product firms (Gregory et al. 2009:
Table 6.4). We do not have more recent data but it thus seems that average R&D
intensity in the software industry was low compared to the Brazilian auto industry.
This is partly explained by the overall service focus (rather than software product
focus) of the Indian software industry, which reduces the need for R&D investment
(Bhatnagar 2006: 73). 
Moreover, Table 5.5 shows that although Indian MNC firms invest most in R&D,
most patenting activity is undertaken by foreign firms. Nevertheless, some Indian-
owned software firms are now beginning to file for patents as there is increasing
Table 5.3 Sample firms: patents submitted and granted in Brazil
Firm Ownership Patents Patents Patents
submitted submitted granted
2001/2003 2003/2005 1994/2003
Arteb Brazilian 7 — 1
ArvinMeritor Foreign 21 9 2
Bosch Foreign 3 7 1
Freios Master Brazilian — 1 —
Lupatech Brazilian 1 2 2
Mahle Metal Leve Foreign 1 — 7
Sabó Brazilian 5 7 17
ZF Sachs Foreign — — 2
Total 41 26 36
Source: INPI (Brazilian National Patent Office). Note that this is a special tabulation
produced for the IBI Project (Brazilian Innovation Index). There is an overlap between the
two time intervals considered in patent submission, as the year 2003 is counted in both.
Only inventions made by Brazilian nationals have been considered in this special INPI
tabulation, even if the patent holder is a multinational corporation.
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scope for filing patents in the software services. This is what the evidence from
sample firms suggests: Infosys filed 79 patents to USPTO and the Indian patent
office in 2008, Wipro filed for 17 patents in 2007, Sasken has been granted an
accumulated 20 patents and MindTree has been granted 12 at the time of writing.6
5.1.3 Insights and limitations
The secondary data is sketchy – particularly in the case of India – but overall, the
conventional indicators suggest that R&D and patenting activities are growing in
both industries, albeit from a small base. These quantitative indicators provide some
insights but they are insufficient to assess the innovation capabilities in the selected
industries. These standard metrics reflect patterns of innovation only in certain kinds
of sectors (NESTA 2007) and – as will be shown – the chosen sector/country sites
innovate in ways which are only partially reflected in these metrics. In both cases,
Table 5.4 Existence of R&D activity in software firms in India in
2009/10 (%)
Standalone Subsidiary of Headquarter of Total
MNCs MNCs
R&D No 53.89 25.47 22 39.63
R&D Yes 46.11 74.53 78 60.37
Total 100 100 100 100 
(n=325 firms)
Source: Joseph and Abraham (2011).
Table 5.5 Patenting activities of selected leading software firms in India
Company 2004–05 2005–06
Filed Granted Filed Granted 
Adobe Foreign 10 - 32* -
Cadence Foreign 1 5 - -
Flextronics Foreign 2 1 4 1
Freescale Foreign 10 - 16 4
i-flex Indian 1 - 1 -
Infosys ** Indian - - 20 -
Microsoft Foreign 40 - 70 -
MindTree ** Indian 1 - 2 -
Ramco Indian 16 - 16 -
Sasken ** Indian 5 - 5 5
ST Micro Foreign 62 32 37 14
Subex Indian - - 2 -
Symantec Foreign 47 43 57 16
TCS Indian 16 5 13 4
Texas Instruments Foreign 35 10 - -
Source: Adapted from Arora (2006), based on DQ estimates. All figures of foreign firms
represent US patents filed by the Indian R&D facilities of these MNCs in all fields, not just
software patents. 
*Adobe’s patents represent the total number of patents filed since start of India operations.
** Sample firms included in this study.
6 This information was drawn from annual reports.
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7 For example, a comparison between firms in Germany and Brazil would need to unpack the category
‘problem identification and solution’ since it includes research activities of different degrees of complexity.
8 Systematic comparison across the auto and software sectors – using the categories of ‘advanced’,
‘intermediate’ and ‘basic’ innovation capabilities proposed by Bell and Pavitt (1995) and Ariffin and
Figueiredo (2006) – proved impossible because innovation in manufacturing and services differ
substantially. For our purposes, the categories proposed in Figure 5.1 proved more useful and
straightforward. While applicability of the Bell and Pavitt framework was more difficult in the case of
software. For our purposes, the categories proposed in Figure 5.1 proved more useful and
straightforward. For the application of the Bell and Pavitt framework in the Brazilian auto case, see
Quadros (2009).
9 The figure describes processes that apply – in principle – to any development project, whether it is
concerned with a component or an entire system. We maintain this focus on the immediate user’s
problem (even if the buying company itself is a subsystem supplier in intermediate markets) in order to
avoid the problem of modularity and different levels of analysis. 
significant innovation occurred outside the R&D department. In order to capture this
and examine how deep it goes, one needs to rely on qualitative case study material.
This is presented next. 
5.2 Trajectories and value chain tasks
In order to understand and compare the level of innovation activities in the sample
firms, it is useful to distinguish between high-level ‘systemic’ development and
low-level ‘applied’ development. Strambach (2009) has suggested these concepts
for the analysis of the German software and auto industry and we have adapted
them for our cases – see Figure 5.1. 
This conceptual approach helps to capture broad changes over time and to do
this in a comparative way. The substance behind Figure 5.1 is complex but the
overall idea is simple: firms able to carry out activities on the left side have
reached a higher level of capability than those firms that can ‘only’ carry out
activities shown on the right side. The groupings of activities can be contested –
and different groupings would be useful for different industries and different
objectives7 – but for our purposes, Figure 5.1 is very helpful. It brings out that in
both industries, the majority of the sampled firms have been able to make the shift
from low-level ‘applied’ development to high-level ‘systemic’ development.8 This
requires elaboration.
In order to assess the ‘level’ firms had reached at the time of the fieldwork, we
focused on the most significant innovation events. The idea was to approximate
firms’ capability levels by identifying product and process events (milestones) which
were particularly challenging for the sampled firms. We examined these firms’
(subsidiaries and suppliers) ability to cope with the ‘problem’ (in process or products)
put to them by the lead firms (parent firms or buyers).9 As discussed, lead firms
have tended to keep for themselves basic research and the high-level ‘systemic’
development activities while farming out downstream tasks. We re-examined this,
comparing reality in the 2000s with reality in the 1990s reported in previous research
on the Brazilian auto industry (Cassiolato et al. 2001; Quadros 2004) and the
Indian software industry (D’Costa 2002; Lema 2009a). We focused on what
sampled firms ‘could do’ – as indicated by actual activity in the innovation events. 
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5.2.1 Brazilian automotive industry 
Until the late 1990s, product development activities by automakers in Brazil had
concentrated on adapting foreign platforms to local conditions (tropicalisation) and,
to a lesser extent, on developing local models – or derivative vehicles – from global
platforms to suit local demand requirements. After the 1990s, some assemblers
went beyond this level by accumulating capabilities in designing and engineering
complete derivative vehicles (Consoni and Quadros 2006). A ‘complete derivative
vehicle’ corresponds to more than a regular derivative and less than a completely
new platform. Usually derivatives are built on the hatch model of a vehicle platform
in order to offer options in the same product ‘family’: saloons, wagons and light
pick-ups. A completely new derivative bears little or no resemblance to the original
platform on which it is built. It is an entirely new design and body on top of a known
mechanical platform, thus including various new items. In Brazil, models like GM
Meriva, VW Fox and the new GM Agile are complete derivatives. Indeed, the idea
of complete derivatives somehow denies or contradicts the concept of the global
platform, since the level of change it implies, including major changes in the body
and thus in body dynamics, requires a considerable amount of re-engineering and
re-validation that requires substantial innovation.10
The changes over time apply to both multinational and local firms. Starting with
the former, three out of four sampled multinational OEM suppliers have
established themselves in Brazil through acquisitions (brown field investment).
This applies to ArvinMeritor (acquisition of Rockwell/ Braseixos, in the 1950s),
Mahle (acquisition of Metal Leve, in the 1990s) and ZF Sachs (acquisition of
BorgWarner, in the 1980s). The trajectories of these firms show that these units
have upgraded their capabilities both before and after foreign ownership. Bosch
has also undergone a rapid transformation in capability profiles between the early
1990s and the late 2000s. They shifted from application development to problem
identification over a 15–20 year period. The exception to this is Metal Leve (now
Mahle Metal Leve), that already had advanced capabilities in the early 1990s.
The capability transformation of local OEMs is similar to that of the MNC segment,
although it is not entirely matched. In the early 1990s, most local firms in the
sample engaged in application development. Sabó had already mastered variant
development. However, most local firms (all but Sifco and Suspensys) were able
to progress to high-level systemic development, albeit to different degrees. As will
be discussed, this advance is partly explained by the opportunity to participate in
co-design with their customers (see section 7.2). 
In order to bring out the full progress made by some of these firms, one would
need to add the category of ‘Research’ to Figure 5.1. Mahle, ZF Sachs and Sabó
have been able to create and introduce product innovations that are based on
substantial research. This advance into research is reflected in Table 5.7 and
detailed in Quadros (2009). 
The key point concerning the advances made by sampled Brazilian companies
can be made by contrasting them with their counterparts in Germany. In Brazil,
10 In the case of the GM Meriva, the new vehicle is a hybrid, because some of its components are
common to the Corsa platform and others to the Astra platform.
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11 Except for the Mahle Metal Leve case which has a formal mandate for technology research.
research tends to be subsumed under New Product Development and focused on
specific problems as and when they arise.11 In contrast, the German companies
have corporate research centres working systematically on broader challenges
(Strambach 2009). 
5.2.2 Indian software industry 
Most of the MNCs in the Indian sample have established themselves in Bangalore
through green-field foreign direct investment (FDI). SAP Labs, Robert Bosch
Engineering and Business Solutions Limited (RBEI), Siemens Information
Systems Limited (SISL) and Siemens Communication Systems (SCS) were all
established in Bangalore during the 1990s. These subsidiaries have undergone a
rapid transition in a relatively short time period. The case of SAP Labs is
illustrative. When the subsidiary was first established in 1997, work was assigned
on a ‘black-box’ basis, meaning that the headquartering Waldorf, Germany,
undertook all elements of high-level design whereas the Lab in Bangalore was
focused on coding and testing to tight specification, without any in-depth
understanding of the context in which the code was being used. In 2000, SAP
Labs Bangalore started with localisation of existing products – thus moving into
requirement analysis and design – even though the high-level architecture was
defined in Germany. Today the independent new product development of SAP
Labs Bangalore has a global reach and the number of patents that SAP
Bangalore files has gone up year by year, and the number of patents per
employee filed from India is now twice that of patents filed from Waldorf. While
this is mirrored by RBEI and, to some extent SCS, SISL has progressed less.
Symbian India entered the market through a phased acquisition, in a build-
operate-transfer agreement with a local firm. Before and after the takeover the unit
has moved from maintenance, over co-development to independent development.
The dramatic growth that occurred in the 1990s – mainly in the second half –
encouraged a large number of local suppliers to enter the market, including most
of those discussed in our sample. However, the largest firms, Infosys and Wipro,
started their (customised) software development activities in the early 1980s.
During the 1990s, these firms specialised in the provision of programming
services (coding and testing) to relatively tight specifications. They were soon
joined by incumbents such as Kshema, MindTree and RelQ (a dedicated software
testing firm), all of which were spinoffs from larger software service houses. Firms
such as Sasken developed solutions for the personal computer market in the form
of ‘embedded software’. They were already undertaking innovative activities – the
in-house development of reusable and proprietary solutions – but they were
generally not involved in high-level design activities; the latter were undertaken by
customers who needed to ensure operability with other parts of their systems. At
the same time, there were a number of smaller startups – Aditi and Aztecsoft –
that shared the dream of bringing made-in-India software products to the world
market. In this sense, they were all working in the field of high-level software
design. However, none of these enjoyed success due to different reasons,
including inadequate (or misguided) problem identification and requirement
12 These problems were pointed out by senior managers in these firms. 
13 While the provision of standard independent testing services (ITS) is a routine-based activity, RelQ (and
incumbents in the ITS field) have accumulated the critical mass of specialised expertise in this area that
enabled them to enter the field of test consulting. Indian ITS firms increasingly engage in testing
management and consulting services such as test and quality assurance strategy and certifications.
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analysis, sometimes poor quality of the products, and limited marketing resources.
In this sense their efforts at leapfrogging into high-level system development was
premature.12 Furthermore, some of them came under severe financial pressure as
they had addressed the US internet and related technology market which crashed
just after the turn of the twenty-first century. 
The 2001 slowdown in the IT sector was an inflection point for all of the sampled
firms as it forced firms to rethink their markets, business strategies and
technological competence profiles. In 2001, the management team in Infosys was
in intense strategic deliberations concerning how the firm should respond to the
crisis. According to one of the company founders, the leadership group realised
that the firm had to enter the ‘creamy layer’ that was occupied by brand-name
consultancy houses. 
We realised that we had to compete with, say, IBM and Accenture. We don’t
want to supply to IBM and Accenture who will take away the cream. We need
to enter the creamy layer. If your technological edge vanishes, then who do
you compete with? At that time, it was a question of our existence.
(Infosys interviewee, 28 November 2006)
The new strategy was to develop the company’s consulting business, helping the
customers to meet business challenges through improvements to business
processes. This meant that they would need to take part in the processes that
define and transform customers’ or end-users’ IT and software systems. Since
then, the firm has had substantial success in this field, supported by important
internal innovations. In general, business software services firms – such as
Infosys, MindTree, Wipro, RelQ – have refocused their lines of business and
developed new domain competencies. They have developed domain expertise
and frontline capabilities, and they are no longer only in programming mode, even
though the labour intensive ‘execution’ element of business remains important.
Crucially, they participate in high-level co-design, sometimes including
requirement analysis and even problem identification. In contrast, RelQ, now
owned by HP, took the ‘functional deepening’ route, specialising in testing.
Carving out such spaces as separate and independent activity allowed these
companies to establish new and innovative processes.13 Sasken has re-oriented
towards the telecommunication markets and has developed systems integration
competencies, as is evident, for example, in the development of integrated
multimedia solutions for handset manufacturers. The software products startups
have either taken the services route, now providing offshore product development
services including high-level design services (Aditi and Aztecsoft – now owned by
MindTree) or have reoriented their strategies in the local and global markets.
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5.2.3 Summary and examples
To summarise, an inter-temporal comparison shows that over the last ten to 15 years
both multinational and local firms have progressed substantially even though not
all to the same extent. The majority of the sample firms have progressed from
low-level ‘applied’ to high-level ‘systemic’ capabilities in both the Brazilian automotive
and the Indian software industry (Table 5.6).
Specifying which of the sectors had achieved a higher level would, however, be
difficult. The Brazilian auto firms have more examples of research-based problem-
solving strategies; but the software firms have progressed over a shorter period of
time. Pushing this cross-sector comparison further would be un-productive
because there are inherent sector-specific and country-specific differences which
determine what firms can and cannot do. More important for our purposes is the
inclusion of hidden innovation in the assessment of the capabilities. 
Table 5.7 gives for both sectors ten examples of innovation resulting from high-
level capabilities. For the purposes of illustration, some of these examples are
worth elaborating on further: Sabó, one of the largest (and oldest) Brazilian auto-
parts suppliers, developed an integrated oil sealing system and sensor (IOSS) for
the new VW Polo, launched in 2002. Over 2.5 years, 20 engineers in Sabó led the
development of the sensor in cooperation with a French developer of sensor
technology, enabling electronically controlled fuel consumption and emission
measurement in the Polo, and later in other vehicles. Similarly, the Brazilian
subsidiary of Bosch developed a flex-fuelling system for passenger cars. This
system was initially aimed at the local market, but it ‘went global’ as biofuels
became increasingly important worldwide. The development of this flex solution –
working with petrol, ethanol or natural gas – has placed the Brazilian subsidiary in
a strategic position within Bosch and deemed it a centre of excellence in flex-
fuelling systems. R&D is relatively important for capability expansion in the auto-
parts business. Seven out of 12 interviewed suppliers used substantial R&D for
their innovations; three of them were Brazilian owned (Arteb, Lupatech and Sabó).
Although R&D is generally less important in the software supply base, some
suppliers relied on substantial R&D inputs. For instance, Infosys Technologies,
one of India’s largest software developers, created InFlux, a proprietary framework
Table 5.6 Evolution of capabilities in sample firms
Brazilian automotive industry Indian software industry 
1990s Majority of firms focused on Majority of firms focused on coding, 
application development. Only testing and other tasks in low-level 
two firms with proven capabilities ‘applied’ development. Only two firms with 
in high-level ‘systemic’ proven capabilities in high-level design 
development (Metal Leve and (Aditi and Aztecsoft)
Sabó)
2000s Majority of firms have proven Majority of firms have proven capabilities 
capabilities in problem in high-level design including problem 
identification and solutions. Only identification (Infosys Wipro, RBEI and 
two firms without proven SAP). Only two firms with capabilities 
capabilities in high-level confined within low-level design stage 
‘systemic’ development (Sifco (SISL, RelQ) 
and Suspensys)
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for business process modelling (BPM). SETLabs, the primary R&D unit in Infosys,
deployed nine engineers, including several PhDs, for 12 months in the effort to
develop the framework in 2001. Today this solution supports Infosys’ foray into the
global IT consulting space. It aims to capture ‘business requirements’ and aids the
translation of these into technical specifications. It has been used in in-house
consulting projects and licensed out to leading IT houses in OECD countries.
MindTree Consulting, a startup established in 1999, engaged in the end-to-end
development of a sales tools system for aftermarket trucks, for a leading
European auto manufacturer. It participated in requirement-level system definition
and was responsible for the overall design and subsequent coding of the system.
Both of these examples illustrate that software suppliers participated in the
architectural definition of buyers’ systems and products. 
5.3 Conclusion
The literature on the Brazilian auto and Indian software industries tend to be
pessimistic regarding their innovative capabilities (see section 2). This section,
drawing on our own primary research, gives a more optimistic picture of the
sampled firms. Some segments of these industries have innovation capabilities of
a significant depth. 
The R&D intensity in the Brazilian auto industry is significantly higher than in Brazilian
manufacturing on average. While much of this is still concentrated in assemblers, all
of the sampled suppliers have begun to carry out substantial R&D and some have
patented their innovations. The case material shows that this also applies to suppliers
owned by Brazilian nationals. This finding runs counter to literature which suggests
that Brazilian-owned suppliers had only a minor or no role in design and engineering
activities (Salerno et al. 2003). Furthermore, the findings refute the expectation that
the national auto-parts supply industry would be crowded out of knowledge intensive
activities, following the de-nationalisation wave of the 1990s, which affected important
Table 5.7 Innovation events (milestones) reflecting capabilities in high-
level systemic design 
Brazilian automotive industry Indian software industry
z Arteb: Top Colour Enamel z Aditi – Online Digital Media Distribution 
z ArvinMeritor: MS-113Tractive Axle Platform 
z Bosch: Flex power-train fuelling system z Aztecsoft: ETL Tool for Data warehousing
z Fras-le: PD-981Non-steel (brake pad) z HP/EDS India – Billing and operations 
z Letande: Injected connectors and z support solution
Cables for Flex-fuel Pumps z Infosys – InFlux tool for mapping business 
z Lupatech: PADS – Plasma-assisted z processes
debinding and sintering process z MindTree – Partner CRM sales tool system
z Mahle: PVD-based Chrome Piston Rings z SAP Labs India – SAP Business ByDesign
z Master: Brake system HD, z Sasken – Multimedia Subsystem
325x100/120mm Tube z Symbian India – PIPS Posix library 
z Sabó: IOSS – Integrated Oil-sealing solution for software migration
System with Sensor z Wipro: Cross-applicable Ultra wideband 
z ZF Sachs: Sachs 188 and Sachs 620 solution
(non-leaded clutch linings) z Wipro – Lean Software Framework
Source: Authors’ fieldwork: Lema (2009b) and Quadros (2009). Note: Listed alphabetically
according to ownership (at time of fieldwork). 
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brands like Metal Leve, Cofap and Varga. It is interesting to note that less known
brands such as Lupatech and Randon, together with surviving brands like Sabó and
Arteb have increased their innovation capabilities. 
Formal R&D seems to play a lesser role in the Indian software industry, but the
data remains sketchy. Case studies show that the larger firms, in particular, are
beginning to establish substantial internal research departments. Patenting is also
increasing in importance for selected firms, some of which have accumulated
impressive patent portfolios. However, input and output indicators do not capture
the full extent of capability accumulation in the sampled firms. The interview-based
analysis of firm trajectories indicated a major transformation over a ten-year period.
They are increasing their share of knowledge intensive tasks in the software value
chains and have carried out high-level ‘systemic’ design tasks in the innovation
events we analysed. The findings qualify the existing literature (Arora et al. 2008;
D’Costa 2009; Dossani 2006) by showing that an important segment of innovation-
active firms have emerged in the industry over the last ten years. 
The analysis provided here does not allow generalisation to the whole industry.
Our samples are not representative, but designed purposefully to maximise the
insights into the global and national reorganisation of innovation. Undoubtedly,
there are many ‘non-innovators’ in both the Brazilian auto-parts and Indian
software Industry. On the other hand, our samples do not constitute the only
innovation-active firms. Less known brands like DHB, Aethra, Metagal, Pematech
and Zen in Brazil could possibly be included in this group and deserve further
investigation. In India, the sample was limited to firms located in Bangalore, and
many more firms could have been identified both within and outside Bangalore.
There is no reason to believe that the sampled firms are significantly more
innovative than other Indian firms such as Ittiam, L&T Infotech, Satyam Computer
Services, Subex Systems, Tata Consultancy Services and others. Patent data and
R&D data can confirm this but – as stressed throughout this paper – the full extent
and depth of capabilities only becomes apparent once we include those
innovation activities which are outside the R&D department.
6 Lead firms and the organisational
decomposition of innovation 
The previous chapter has shown that substantial innovation capabilities have
been built up in the rising powers. This chapter examines how the old powers
have contributed to this build-up. It concentrates on the European and American
lead firms in the auto and software firms, asks how they have reorganised the
innovation process and how this has affected their subsidiaries and suppliers in
Brazil and India. The main questions driving this chapter are: what types of ODIP
did the lead firms adopt and what opportunity spaces have opened up for the
subsidiaries and suppliers in Brazil and India. 
Section 6.1 takes a lead-firm view. Drawing on the insights from case study firms
(and secondary literature where relevant), we sketch out the key changes in
innovation practices among lead firms in the respective industries. Sections 6.2
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14 According to a study by the US National Academy of Engineering, which was based on primary
information, the three US companies which provided data revealed that they spent less than 10 per
cent on basic or applied research and more than 90 per cent on product and process development
(Moavenzadeh 2008: 69).
and 6.3 then examine what the (cross-border) ODIP means for new innovation
spaces in Brazil and India respectively. Section 6.4 examines the limits and
boundaries of this process and section 6.5 summarises the main findings.
6.1 Changes in the innovation process and lead-firm restructuring 
6.1.1 Automotive industry 
The global automotive industry is second only to the pharmaceutical industry in
total volume of R&D expenditure ($ 55.1 billion, in 2006), while four out of the top
ten global firms ranked by R&D investment are automotive companies
(Moavenzadeh 2008). The globalisation of innovation in the automotive industry is
evident from the study of German lead firms. As observed by Strambach (2009),
the automotive industry is a multi-technology industry, drawing on a variety of
knowledge domains, including most physics and chemistry-based engineering
disciplines and a booming field of automotive ICT. It is increasingly difficult to
master all these fields of knowledge, and the capability to integrate different
competences and technologies is critical for innovation. It is this increasing
complexity of innovation that drives the tendencies to include more external actors
and foreign subsidiary units in the development of new products and processes. 
However, in spite of increasing technology complexity, New Product Development
(NPD) accounts for an overwhelming share of R&D investment vis-à-vis research
on new technology exploration.14 Moreover, while most innovative activities remain
concentrated in the old powers, increasing importance is given to innovation in the
rising powers, in particular China and Brazil. This is where the markets are
growing; this is where investment in new product development is rising fast.
We found that Brazil’s new role in the corporate networks takes two main forms.
First, some global auto firms are decentralising the R&D department by setting up
formal research units. This seems particularly important in the case of some global
OEM suppliers. Mahle and ZF Sachs, two German suppliers, have both extended
their corporate R&D networks with R&D units in São Paulo. Secondly, and most
frequently, MNCs (assemblers and OEMs) are now delegating the development of
new products to subsidiaries and they are setting up competence centres for this
purpose. Some subsidiaries have the mandate for end-to-end development of new
vehicles, systems and components for the Brazilian and the global market. 
6.1.2 Software industry 
Lead firms in the global software industry have also reorganised their innovation
processes. Multinational firms have established R&D facilities in countries such as
India and Israel, even if such investments were only made after rapid growth in
indigenous firms (Giarratana et al. 2005). Of equal importance is the role of global
buyers that do not establish subsidiaries, but engage in cross-border trade. Their
interactions with Indian suppliers have become much more knowledge intensive
15 Lupatech and Arteb have worked on innovation projects for GM-USA and Sabó has worked for
VW Germany.
16 In the second instance, ODIP becomes external. This is discussed in section 7. 
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over time as they have evolved towards innovation outsourcing (Jensen 2009;
Lema 2009b). This tendency towards cross-border innovation sourcing is also
observed in the study of German software firms. Oswald (2008: 35) found that
software firms in Baden-Wuertemberg had gone through distinct phases in terms
of offshored content: the tasks outsourced to countries such as India and Malaysia
evolved over low-level design, architectural design to global product responsibility.
In tandem with this evolution in outsourced work, the software firms in Germany
re-focused their in-house work. They increasingly focused on higher value tasks
which depend heavily on vertical knowledge and on experience-based knowledge
of the end-users’ business processes (Oswald 2008). Such knowledge was
generated in long-term relationships and required close interaction.
Similarly, Lema (2010) found that some software firms in the USA and Europe
were changing their sourcing behaviour in important ways, increasingly creating
opportunities for innovation by suppliers in India. This was linked to restructuring
in lead-firm organisations. Innovation was often decentralised within the firm, thus
affecting the business units with outsourcing/offshore engagements in India. Core
staff in the lead firms in the software services space were increasingly drawn into
the innovation process of end-users and typically focused on non-technical
elements of innovation. This created an internal vacuum that increased the space
for developing new technical innovative capability in supplier firms. 
6.2 Automotive industry: ODIP and new spaces in Brazil 
The scope of lead firms’ activities in the Brazilian automotive industry has risen
steadily over the past 20 years, from adaptation to complete vehicle design
(Quadros and Consoni 2009; Quadros 2009). To varying degrees, this holds true for
the four major lead assemblers, General Motors (GM), Volkswagen (VW), Fiat and
Ford. Today, these subsidiaries have robust product development capabilities and
distinct product development mandates. Only the Japanese assemblers (Toyota and
Honda) stick to the policy of keeping product development and adaptation entirely
centralised in the Japanese or North American product development units. 
New innovation mandates for Brazil are prominent also in the MNC OEM supplier
segment. Table 6.1 shows the ODIP patterns of the sampled multinationals. External
decomposition directly from German or American headquarters directly to Brazilian
suppliers happens but remains rare.15 More common is the decomposition internal to
the firm– at least in the first instance.16 It is concentrated on Type 1 and Type 2,
using the categorisation proposed in Table 3.1. These are discussed in turn.
6.2.1 Type 1 – Decentralising the R&D department with a substantial unit in
Brazil 
Only two firms practice ODIP type 1. The Brazilian subsidiaries of German auto-
parts producers ZF Sachs and Mahle host R&D units which carry out
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technological research and experimentation. Such units are in charge of exploring
the development of new technologies to be incorporated into the products not just
in Brazil but worldwide. These R&D units were not built from scratch but based on
previous R&D capabilities developed within the Brazilian firm (Mahle Metal Leve)
or MNC subsidiary (BorgWarner).
The German corporation Mahle took over the well-known Brazilian auto-parts
firms Metal Leve and Cofap in 1996, and benefited from both companies’ two
decades of building R&D capabilities. The knowledge and capabilities acquired
from Cofap and Metal Leve have been the platform on which Mahle has built its
Brazilian Technological Centre, which is one of the five centres of Mahle’s global
R&D network. The Brazilian subsidiary can be expected to play an increasingly
important role in research. It is leading a research consortium which seeks to
produce new scientific knowledge on the peculiar tribological challenges of flex-
fuel engines. The consortium includes multinational auto assemblers (VW, GM,
Renault and Fiat), Brazilian energy firms (notably Petrobras) and academic
research groups from the Universities of São Paulo and Campinas.
The R&D carried out by ZF Sachs is concentrated in its Friction Materials
Business Unit (FMBU) and Laboratory – FM Lab. The German Headquarters
decided to concentrate R&D facilities in Brazil because the subsidiary had more
experience and competencies at the time of the decision. Decades of previous
accumulation of local technological capabilities has contributed to the global
status of this R&D unit, as ZF Sachs benefited from the experience of the
BorgWarner subsidiary in Brazil, whose acquisition was the gateway for Sachs
into the Brazilian market.
6.2.2 Type 2 – Delegating the development of new products to Brazilian
subsidiaries 
The main pattern of ODIPing in the Brazilian automobile value chain is one of
decentralising NPD. This is prevalent because MNCs are the primary drivers of
ODIP in this industry and, so far, ODIP type 2 prevails over ODIP type 1 amongst
global assemblers and auto-parts suppliers. This tendency is reinforced by the
vast predominance of NPD in innovation activities and investment in the auto
industry, as seen above. 
Table 6.1 Types of ODIP – automotive lead firms
Intra-firm Extra-firm
Firm Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4
ArvinMeritor X X
Bosch X X
General Motors X (X)
Mahle X X X
VW X (X)
ZF Sachs X X X
Source: Author’s own fieldwork: Quadros (2009). Note: The lead firms sample includes
both assemblers and multinational OEM suppliers. (X) denotes indirect ODIP, from
subsidiary to supplier.
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17 In 2006, the product development engineering unit located in GM do Brasil’s Technology Centre has
become integrated into the newly created Global Architecture Development Team (GADT). GADT has
been organised by GM Corporation as one, integrated and global NPD engineering operation, based
on a network of five centres located in the US, Germany, Korea, Brazil and Australia. 
18 Information collected in interviews. Rick Wagoner GM global CEO reported to the press that 2,000
employees were involved in product development, at the close of 2007. His expectation was that this
staffing level would grow to 2,800 employees by the end of 2008.
19 GM’s product development test ground in Indaiatuba, state of São Paulo, is the third in terms of
importance and value of investment amongst GM’s test grounds in the world. Recent product
development infra-structure investment by GM in Brazil comprised the implementation, in 2006, of a
virtual reality, 3D project room, a facility that only Embraer, the aircraft manufacturer, had in Brazil until
then (Quadros 2009). The project of the architecture of the Meriva, which was launched as a global
model, was entirely carried out by GM’s product development unit, at São Caetano technology centre
and Indaiatuba test ground and labs. The Meriva project led GM’s Brazilian subsidiary to substantially
upgrade its product development capability, because through this project the product development staff
mastered all phases of product development, from concept to validation (Consoni and Quadros 2006).
General Motors is a good example. In 2005, GM headquarters granted the
Brazilian products development engineering unit the status of competence centre
for product development,17 thus becoming part of the network of five product
development centres. This was followed by an incremental increase in product
development staff, from 400 engineers in 1999, to 660 engineers in 2005
(Quadros and Queiroz 2001; Balcet and Consoni 2007). In 2007, the plant
employed 1,300 engineers in product development.18 The status of centre of
competence for product development engineering followed the completion of the
Meriva project. The Chevrolet Meriva was developed for the global market by GM
do Brasil’s Technological Centre in São Caetano do Sul, in the Metropolitan Area
of São Paulo. Today the Brazilian product development unit is in charge of product
development of global middle-sized SUV architectures, as well as designing
regional derivatives for the Latin American area. For some models, for example
GM’s Hummer brand, the product development takes place in Brazil, but the
manufacturing is carried out elsewhere.19
Volkswagen do Brasil’s (VW) product development engineering unit has also
gained importance as a platform for product development. The development of the
Fox model was the milestone that signified the mastering of all phases of product
development. According to the CEO of the Brazilian subsidiary, the Brazilian
product development unit specialises in entry-level cars and may be assigned
product development tasks aimed at other markets. Although in the late 1990s
VW had considered a more centralising approach to product development
management, which would have meant strengthening Germany at the expense of
Brazil, this is not what happened eventually. VW expanded its product development
staff, from 450 engineers, in 1999, to 650 engineers, in 2005. This does not take
into account the 400 product development engineering staff of VW T&B, which is a
separate company and will be dealt with in chapter 7. Recent product development
infrastructure investment by VW in Brazil comprised a US$ 2.5 million virtual reality,
3D project room, which was inaugurated by German Chancellor Angela Merkel in
May 2009. In the next five years, ten new VW car models are scheduled to be
designed in the São Bernardo product development unit, as compared to 15 models
that were developed throughout the entire history of the subsidiary.
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ArvinMeritor and Bosch are examples of multinational OEM suppliers adopting
cross-border ODIP type 2 towards their Brazilian subsidiaries. These now have
mandates for NPD and became centres of excellence in particular product lines,
but since the 1980s they have systemically pursued capabilities in NPD and
increased their product engineering areas. They have started by searching for
incremental product changes, mostly designed to meet local market needs:
adapting components to requirements of local fuels, materials and road
conditions. Today, as centres of excellence, they have developed product
innovations (‘our innovation events, Table 5.7) which have been based on internal
R&D and protected by patents. 
Bosch is the largest supplier of systems and components to the automotive
industry in Brazil. The focal point of this research was the Gas Systems (GS)
division of the Brazilian subsidiary. The Brazilian GS division is the corporation’s
centre of competence for biofuels. This is so not only because biofuels related
components are strategic for Bosch worldwide, but also because the subsidiary
has invested in researching, developing and testing ethanol fuel systems for more
than 20 years. Bosch’s flex-fuelling systems, even though originally aimed at
Brazilian flex-fuelled passenger cars, have placed the Brazilian Bosch engineering
team in a strategic position within the corporation. Their experience with flex-
fuelling systems, which work with petroleum gas, ethanol or natural gas, has
opened up the Brazilian engineering unit to unprecedented possibilities of
cooperation with other subsidiaries and headquarters, as biofuels become
increasingly important worldwide. The development of competencies in flex-fuel
systems has been responsible for the considerable increase in Bosch do Brasil’s
R&D efforts. The group of five professionals who started the ethanol fuel systems
in the 1980s now has more than 120 engineers and technicians working in flex-
fuel systems (almost half of the R&D engineering staff). Bosch’s interviewees
reckoned that the R&D/sales ratio in the Brazilian subsidiary was approximately
2 per cent (which is equivalent to € 80 million).The most recent flex-fuel
incremental innovation of the Brazilian subsidiary – the smart start flex system,
which eliminates the need for gas injection when the engine is started – was
granted the 2010 Global Bosch Innovation Award.
The case of ArvinMeritor is smaller in scale, but significant for understanding
ODIP knock-on effects (chapter 7). ArvinMeritor R&D is organised as a network of
four units, comprising three engineering centres and the India Tech Centre, which
specialises in software services. The Brazilian product engineering unit employs
24 engineers dedicated to NPD, including a few engineers holding masters
degrees and one PhD. The Brazilian engineering group works in an integrated
manner with the North American and Italian units. The Brazilian team is
responsible for two types of job: either participating in global projects by
developing specific tasks and jobs, or carrying out the development or adaptation
of products for Latin American customers. Even though this is a relatively small
team, and the expenditure of ArvinMeritor in R&D in Brazil represents only 1 per
cent of revenues, the engineering team alone was responsible for submitting 18
patents in the period 1999–2005. Some of the innovations extended to global
products were originally developed by this team, as illustrated by the innovation
events listed in Table 5.7. 
20 Following the steps of the market leaders, Renault has increased substantially its product development
unit in São José dos Pinhais, state of Paraná and established its South American Design centre in the
city of São Paulo. PSA is also building a substantial product development unit located in São Paulo
(Quadros and Consoni 2009).
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6.2.3 Summary
This section has focused on ODIP types 1 and 2 carried out by auto lead firms
operating in Brazil. The first column in Table 6.2 indicates that such company-
internal but inter-continental ODIP is very common, not limited to the sampled
firms.20 The second column indicates there is substantial outsourcing of innovation
from the (multinational) lead firms to Brazilian-owned suppliers. These ODIP
types 3 and 4 are typically practiced by the Brazilian subsidiaries rather than from
headquarters in the US or Europe. ODIP types 3 and 4 are often a derivative of
types 1 and 2 and require separate analysis which will be presented in chapter 7. 
6.3 Software industry: ODIP and new spaces in India
In the Indian software industry, we observe the same types of cross-border ODIP
as in the Brazilian auto industry – see Table 6.3. However, Type 4 plays a bigger
overall role because of the larger volume of software activity undertaken by
independent suppliers (as opposed to software subsidiaries). 
Table 6.2 Internal and external ODIP of automotive lead firms in Brazil 
Internal ODIP* External ODIP**
General Motors VW Trucks
Volkswagen GMB
Fiat ArvinMeritor
Ford Bosch
Renault Ford
PSA Renault
Daimler (trucks) PSA
Bosch Daimler (trucks)
ArvinMeritor Delphi
Mahle Visteon
ZF Sachs Dana
Delphi Magneti Marelli
Visteon Valeo
Dana VDO
Magneti Marelli TRW
Valeo
VDO
TRW
Pirelli
Source: Interviews, press reports and secondary literature. 
* Company-internal decomposition of the innovation process from headquarters in Europe
or the USA to Brazil. 
** Decomposition of the innovation process from the lead firm in Europe or the USA or
from its subsidiary in Brazil to the Brazilian owned suppliers. 
Note: This is a list of examples not restricted to sample firms; it does not claim to be
comprehensive. 
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6.3.1 ODIP Type 1 – Decentralising the R&D department with substantial
units in India
This is the least prevalent type of ODIP in the case study firms, but it is
increasing. SAP has a two-tiered R&D structure. First, SAP Research is based in
Waldorf, Germany and has a number of business units in lead markets around the
world. These units are authorised to identify and shape new IT trends and to
explore opportunities that have not yet been developed into products. Second,
there are eight SAP Labs that design and develop new software solutions that
enhance and extend SAP Business Suite and work on new functions and
releases. The Bangalore site performs both of these functions. The subsidiary
employs around 10,000 people of whom about 25 per cent is committed to
research and next generation product development in the SAP Research
network.21 Bosch also has a major R&D operation in India (mainly Bangalore).
Robert Bosch Engineering and Business Solutions (RBEI) is the software division
of Bosch in India, with over 5,800 associates and the largest development centre
of Bosch outside Germany. As RBEI states on its website: ‘The remarkable thing
about the systems that document the innovative strength of our company is that
much of their intelligence now comes from India’.22 This is backed up by the fact
that RBEI in Bangalore had filed for more than 50 patents at the time of fieldwork.
6.3.2 ODIP Type 2 – Delegating the development of new products to Indian
subsidiaries
This type of ODIP was more widespread in the sample and sometimes a
companion of the internal decentralisation of R&D. In 2000, SAP Labs Bangalore
started with localisation of existing products but today the independent new
product development efforts of SAP Labs Bangalore has a global reach. Today, in
the words of the CEO Claus Neuman, Bangalore is ‘no longer just given work that
is pre-defined and thought through somewhere else’. However, there is still a
division of labour. Neuman explains the division between Waldorf, Germany and
Bangalore:
21 Source: www.sap.com/india/about/company/saplabs/index.epx (accessed 1 August 2009).
22 Source: www.boschindia.com/content/language1/html/14089.htm (accessed 1 August 2009).
Table 6.3 Types of ODIP – software lead firms
Internal External
Firm Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4
Bosch X X
HP/EDS X
Nokia X
Passalong X
SAP X X
Siemens X X
(SISL and SCS)
Symbian X X X
Volvo IT X
Source: Firm interviews. 
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We do the platforms elements that need integrated engineering in Waldorf.
And we do a lot of innovations that sit on the platform in India. You can
compare this with a car. A car manufacturer makes a platform that needs in the
end to fit many products. And this platform is engineered in Germany, but all
the things that make the difference for the customer – the user interface, the
analytics, the reporting and all the things that are the touch and feel of the
product – they come from India. On those design-oriented features, we have
realised that the Indian colleagues are more innovative. 
One example is the SAP Business ByDesign product (released September 2007),
a flagship product in SAP’s efforts to extend its reach into the mid-market for ERP
(enterprise resource planning) applications. While the suite has been launched
globally including in the US and Germany markets, SAP Labs Bangalore could
draw on the experience and knowledge derived from the Indian market as this
product addresses a distinct market of medium-sized business (100–500 employees),
including firms that have not before invested in advanced ERP solutions. 
We said OK here’s a product. You get the responsibility; now you have to fulfil
the KPIs [Key Performance Indicators]… And it worked. The whole customer
interaction, the user interfaces and the whole way this software works is all
coming from Bangalore. And they did this with a completely new approach to
software development that means there is no hands-on coding anymore – it is
a model-based development process, so people put models together instead
and you have to think this through very carefully. It means that the
development processes as well as the product are both complete innovations
– and both coming from Bangalore… The customer satisfaction went up and
the speed of innovation went up.
(Interview with CEO Neuman of SAP)
Some of the pressure for moving in this direction came from the employees. Job
satisfaction was not very high in the Indian subsidiary because the ‘old’ way of
working – in which Indians worked to tight specifications under German leadership
– was found to be unchallenging by many. In order to attract and retain
experienced staff SAP leadership realised that changes were needed. In a step
away from this model, Bangalore was mandated with the ‘ownership’ of complete
separable business domains. For instance, Bangalore was given responsibility for
the SAP Apparel and Footwear Solution and the SAP Oil and Gas Solutions. They
are now completely run out of India. Furthermore, the modes of interaction have
changed in distributed development projects, i.e. projects that are co-developed by
different organisational units (in this case different subsidiaries within SAP). SAP
moved to deeply integrated virtual teams in which all staff in the team interact with
each other. Developers in Germany interact with developers in India, managers in
Germany with managers in India and they have to align with stakeholders across
SAP’s many units across the globe. This rise in subsidiary status was
accomplished in the mid-2000s. Before that the Indian teams were always clearly
guided by experienced colleagues from Germany. SAP would always send a
colleague to India or they would receive very detailed specifications to work on. 
There is some evidence of corporate heterogeneity, implying that large firms
operate with multiple models that have different (offshore) innovation policies. An
illustrative example is Siemens, which has multiple engagements in India. The two
23 Kshema was then absorbed by MphasiS – and later EDS/HP. 
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units interviewed for this research were Siemens Communication Systems (SCS)
and Siemens Information Systems Limited (SISL). SCS, a business unit focused
on the manufacturing of telecom equipment, has an ‘advanced’ policy with a wide
mandate for its Bangalore subsidiary. The subsidiary performs the full range of
activities from design to testing. Siemens Information Systems Limited (SISL), on
the other hand, has delegated only traditional programming tasks to its Bangalore
subsidiary. This means that the tasks in software development accomplished
offshore are limited to ‘execution’ in the sense of fulfilling highly specific and
predefined tasks. The German business unit constructs very detailed
specifications for products and systems and the Indian business unit (SISL) is
focused strictly on execution. IPRs, if developed in the course of software
development, remain in the hands of the customer (Siemens AG in Germany). In
other words, SISL is not part of the innovation network in Siemens. The reason for
this difference is found in the competence profile of the ‘sponsor organisations’ of
the two Bangalore subsidiaries. In SCS, the core business is not software
development and they depend on their Indian unit for the software inputs into
manufactured equipment. In the case of SISL, the sponsor unit is itself a software
developer, working to the requirements of external costumers. They offshore only
labour intensive parts of the software development process. Even though SISL is
co-located in the same building with a Siemens Corporate Technology Unit (part of
the Siemens global R&D network) in Bangalore, linkages between these two
Siemens subsidiaries are virtually non-existent. 
A more cautious ‘India Mandate’ is also observed in Symbian. While based in the
UK, the firm is heavily globalised relying on a network of internal and external
providers for certain aspects of technology development. The division between
internal and external is guided by a set of five policy categories for labelling the
code. The label denotes the legal arrangements that should underpin
development activities. The highest level is a confidential source code, which it
does not distribute at all: all development activities remain in-house in the UK.
Another category is a jointly developed source code, which can involve external
providers by special legal arrangement. In 2003, Symbian started an outsourcing
relationship with Kshema Technologies, a Bangalore-based software services firm.
Kshema established an overseas development centre for Symbian and driven by
cost advantages, became a major partner for the development (implementation)
and maintenance of certain parts of the code in non-critical categories. Operating
at this level Kshema was not initially involved in independent design activities for
Symbian. However, to make more use of the qualified Indian resources for more
central parts of the system, Symbian made an agreement with Kshema that it
would acquire the offshore development centre that had been established in the
Indian firm. This centre was then made a captive Symbian unit. In this way, some
source code design activities that are closer to the core of the system (high-level
design) have become relocated to the captive unit in India.23
Kshema was also involved in pushing innovation activities into the Indian portfolio
of activities of HP/EDS. EDS had acquired MphasiS that – in turn had bought –
Kshema Technologies. Through this route, HP came to own a customer
relationship in which the Indian operations were responsible for maintaining a
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billing and operations support solution for a US Internet infrastructure solutions
provider. This solution, previously developed by Kshema/MphasiS, shows how
ODIP is not always a conscious decision, but something which lead firms get
involved in ‘through the back door’. 
6.3.3 ODIP Type 3 – Cooperating in technology development clubs 
Commissioning standalone research directly from independent organisations in
India is not commonplace, but there is increasing engagement of independent
Indian firms in technology development clubs. For instance, the WiMedia alliance
is an open association that promotes the adoption, regulation, standardisation and
multi-vendor interoperability of ultra wideband (UWB) worldwide. It was through
the participation in this network that one lead firm (not in our sample) interacted
with Wipro which eventually developed its UWB solution. 
Some clubs are more closed in nature. Symbian built a Network of Symbian
Competence Centres (SCCs) to create an ecosystem of Symbian developers
outside their own organisation, but within their controllable reach. To do this,
Symbian designates SCC status to external organisations of their own choice. In
this capacity, Sasken now provides services to licensees of the Symbian operating
system (OS). It maintains a focus on software development and integration skills
to work with a wide range of technologies for use with the OS. Sasken established
a new organisational entity for distinct technological domain offerings, providing
licensees of Symbian technologies with component design, software development
and testing. In developing the Symbian Competence Centre, for instance,
Symbian played a key role in training and auditing Sasken capabilities and
processes. This enables them to function as a certified competence centre
working with third-party users of Symbian technology. It is an example of how
some global lead firms actively share knowledge and invest in Indian firm
capabilities as the business and innovation process becomes more decomposed.
6.3.4 ODIP Type 4 – Engaging Indian suppliers of products and services in
innovation 
In volume terms, the sourcing of software from multinational subsidiaries is not as
important as sourcing from Indian suppliers (through cross-border trade). There is
limited recent comparative data, but in the late 1990s, MNC subsidiaries
accounted for 16 per cent of software exports (Giarratana et al. 2005). In other
words, the outsourcing mandates of independent buyers are probably more
important than subsidiary mandates in MNCs. Major new opportunity spaces for
supplier innovation are created by the demand of buyers. These spaces differ
across buyer segments. Within product development software services, buyers
such as Nokia have defined clear product development strategies with clearly
defined needs for software components. They outsource such elements to India
because suppliers there have developed semi-generic competences and solutions
such as components to enable Bluetooth connectivity in mobile phones. Buying
these from India along with the required customisation services provides a cost-
advantage to their product development efforts. By contrast, the spaces within the
business process software service segment are typically not clearly defined. The
contours are fluid, becoming clearer only in the course of the interaction with the
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supplier. The client is looking for a solution but does not know exactly where it lies
and what it entails. For example, a business unit such as Volvo IT may draw on its
Indian partner to come up with a new CRM system for an internal customer in the
Volvo group. The internal customer has defined the problem but the solution is not
clear. The Indian partner (MindTree) has the ability to add value to the innovation
because it has general expertise in CRM systems and has worked with a range of
automotive firms. While Volvo IT has the detailed contextual knowledge, the
Indian partner contributes centrally to the innovation process (development of the
new CRM system) by drawing on its accumulated knowledge base. Thus, these
types of buyer firms are expecting more value from their software process
suppliers than just the traditional cost advantages derived by outsourcing IT
services. Furthermore, the ‘comfort levels’ rise over time. In the cases reviewed,
the propensity to outsource innovation tasks depends on the competence
demonstrated by suppliers in previous projects. The effect of such changing
sourcing practices is discussed in the next section. 
This section has examined ODIP based on information from our sample firms.
Table 6.4 shows that they were not exceptions. This table lists many other
multinational subsidiaries with major company internal R&D operations in India or
R&D activities outsourced by these subsidiaries to Indian firms. 
6.4 Limits to innovation: spaces and their boundaries 
While there is evidence of remarkable accumulation of innovation capabilities over
the last 10–20 years and indications that ODIP has had an important influence in
this regard, it does not mean that there are no upper limits to this process. These
boundaries are constantly evolving but at any given point in time, their limits have
an influence on the space in which suppliers can innovate. We draw on the
modularity and systems integration literature (Brusoni 2005) because its distinction
between problem framing and problem solving helps to bring out the limits.
However the power of this distinction is greater in the software industry than in the
auto industry, reflecting differences in the technology and configuration of global
value chains. And the picture is by no means uniform within these industries. 
Table 6.4 Internal and external ODIP of software lead firms in India
Internal ODIP External ODIP 
Adobe Hewlett-Packard Alcatel 
American Express IBM Global Services Cisco 
Baan Intel Novell Computer Associates 
Cadence Design Systems Microsoft Ericsson 
Cisco Motorola Farmer’s Insurance 
Citigroup Oracle General Electric 
Computer Associates Philips General Motors 
Cognizant SAP Home Depot 
Deutsche Leasing Siemens IBM 
EDS Sun Microsystems Lucent 
Ericsson Synopsys Motorola 
General Electric Texas Instruments Nokia 
General Motors Yahoo! Nortel Networks 
Google Xerox 
Source: Adapted from Mitra (2007).
24 As shown by Clark and Wheelwright (1992); and Wheelwright and Clark (1992), technology planning
and strategy and product development planning and strategy are two clearly distinct, though integrated
dimensions in the innovation process, responding to different time constraints and challenges.
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6.4.1 Brazil
As shown in section 5.2, some Brazilian suppliers in the automobile industry now
have all the technical knowledge for innovating a particular part or subsystem.
However, the assemblers have, and indeed require, the capability to integrate this
particular subsystem into their overall system and strategy. In this sense, there is
a division between problem-framing activities in assembler firms and problem
solving in supplier firms. Nevertheless, this division is not as neatly drawn as it
might seem at first. Some suppliers – for instance, Bosch and other systems
suppliers – are themselves powerful lead firms and have a big influence on the
systems and strategies of the assemblers. They supply black-box solutions, which
are protected by patents and are beyond the knowledge and control of
assemblers. To be sure, even these big global suppliers develop solutions to the
general performance and interface requirements set by assemblers (Humphrey
2003: 22). New trends in supplier network strategy and management infuse an
element of open system development into the architectural design of cars and
even more so in trucks (Moavenzadeh 2008), but this influence on the macro
design of vehicles rarely extends to locally owned suppliers. This is closely
related to the R&D profile of lead firms and Brazilian suppliers. 
In the automotive industry, R&D is distributed between two distinctive, though
complementary areas: a technology research and development area and a product
development area. Research by Strambach (2009) and Quadros and Consoni
(2009) shows that lead firms in the auto industry undertake product and process
development (in product development engineering units and/or corporate product
engineering networks). This is distinct from the work in corporate research units
that undertake research activities and technology exploration that feeds into major
new features and functionalities in new product platforms or generations. These
can be considered strategic innovation activities, meaning that, as long as the
future of the automobile industry is influenced by assemblers’ technology strategy,
these activities are the most connected to the definition of the future of the
business. Our research suggests that lead firms continue to keep these strategic
innovation activities for their R&D units located in Europe and the USA.24
In Brazilian supplier firms, there is typically no unit with a specific mandate for
applied technological research, except for Mahle Metal Leve and ZF Sachs. R&D
staff work alongside engineers in efforts to solve concrete problems. This means
that product development engineering is not organisationally separated from
technological research. The Brazilian part of the global value chain is primarily
dedicated to product and process design, not only for local or regional markets,
but increasingly also for global markets. When problems arise in the course of
ongoing new product development, such problems are tackled by Brazilian OEMs
or suppliers (either MNCs or national suppliers) which eventually develop new
technological solutions and generate patents. Even though national supplier firms
in this research have carried out problem identification and research to solve
these problems– as seen in the cases of Sabó, Lupatech, and Arteb –
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technological research is rarely strategic for the car or the value chain. Our
research suggests that the relocation of product development activities to Brazil
creates opportunities for local suppliers to engage in co-development, but it also
limits the scope of such innovation activities. In a dynamic perspective, one would
expect this scope to increase over time.
6.4.2 India
In the software industry, buyer segments differ with regard to the space given to
independent suppliers. Electronics and telecoms firms (such as Nokia) mainly
outsource problem solving and innovation support activities. Suppliers feed into
highly coordinated networks and innovation processes in which Indian service
providers play a specialised and bounded role. Physical product design and related
activities are typically kept in-house (or outsourced to specialised providers of
hardware design services). The interface between the software component and the
overall product is specified by the overall product design (and the technical
standards). This has implications for the division of labour between buyer and
supplier. The buyer oversees the design of the overall product (e.g. a chip or
wireless device) and defines the functional requirements of the component. These
specify the behaviour of the component and the interface (external design). The
supplier is left with responsibility for non-functional requirements (such as
performance, security and reliability) and internal design. The buyers provide
carefully defined and limited spaces in which suppliers can innovate.
In contrast, where the buyers are software companies or software departments
(primary and secondary software buyers), they often adopt a different practice. As
mentioned, suppliers are often invited to participate in requirement-definition
activities in a substantial way. It is this limit to codifiability, and the resulting needs
for buyer–supplier interaction that explains why co-framing of requirements was
widespread. This is discussed further in chapter 7 which examines in more detail
ODIP Type 4 relationships. Buyer firms expanded the outsourced value-chain thread
from implementation activities all the way into the realm of problem framing. It is not
easy to stop and draw a clear line of demarcation at the stage of problem solving. 
This does not mean that the distinction between strategic and non-strategic has
vanished. In some cases, the strategic innovation processes are becoming non-
technical. Instead of focusing on product and systems development, managers
focus on developing new business models in which the critical component is the
customer interface. Internal resources are deployed in the areas that enhance user
knowledge and sales capability, in managing other external relationships and in
capturing rent from new business models. The issue of strategic innovation arises
mainly in firms that are willing to let go of component knowledge (problem solving),
while they seek to retain architectural knowledge (problem framing). In this
scenario, architectural knowledge is what matters and knowledge spillover arising
from buyer–supplier interactions is a dangerous threat. However, when the rent-
generating processes move forwards towards the user, the strategic importance of
architectural knowledge is reduced. This insight applies to the software industries,
but not to electronics. It shows, however, that the ‘modular view’ and the
associated view of labour division have limited applicability for a new generation of
firms for which competitive advantage and profitability increasingly lie outside
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25 Nandan Nilekani, then CEO at Infosys: ‘You have to be close to your customers. That is what
companies need to do. They do not want to outsource that, and they shouldn’t. But everything else
can be outsourced’ (quoted in Nussbaum 2006).
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technical areas and within areas of relationship management and the ability to
understand customer problems. Related research on the German software industry
generated findings which support the findings presented here: ‘Software firms in
Germany refocus on higher-value tasks which often depend very heavily on vertical
knowledge and – quite often – on experience-based knowledge of the customers’
business processes generated over long-term relationships’ (Oswald 2008 :72).
Buyers tend to keep high-level design activities at home, but some vanguard firms
are now beginning to outsource these to offshore locations.
As these dynamics evolve, new upper boundaries emerge. Technical problem
framing, and sometimes even certain aspects of non-technical problem framing,
have become less strategic for certain buyers. The new strategic core lies
increasingly in non-technical areas and the customer-facing units. This was clearly
expressed by buyers. As an informant stated: ‘We do not want to bring in someone
else to take the layer between us and the customer’ (Volvo IT). Controlling access to
the customer is increasingly vital both for standalone software houses and for
internal IT units of manufacturing firms (such as Volvo IT) since the latter
increasingly compete and survive on market-based conditions. For buyer firms in
the software industries, cognitive and cultural proximity to their own client or
customer base is therefore a strategic capability. Suppliers are confronted with a
boundary which is essential for furthering business relationships. In the words of the
Infosys manager: ‘This is where the boundary is and that has to be respected.’ In
other words, the upper limits of the current innovation space are clearly defined.25
6.5 Conclusion
In addressing the extension of ODIP to Brazil and India, this chapter has
examined the types of cross-border ODIP practiced by lead firms in the chosen
industries and the initial implications for their local suppliers. The lead firms have
delegated major innovation functions to their subsidiaries and to independent
suppliers in Brazil and India. These functions tend to be highly specialised and
concentrate on product development. The organisational and locational
decomposition of innovation means that lead firms provide new ‘mandates’ and
‘spaces’ to subsidiaries and suppliers in Brazil and India.
The cross-border reconfiguration of formally organised technology research and
exploration activities was weak in both sectors. Our results confirm the
observations that multinationals tend to keep the formal research stage of the
innovation process in the home economy. However, a few firms seem to be
gearing up their research activities in newly formed R&D departments in Brazil
and India. None of the lead firm headquarters (in our sample) commissioned
research directly from external organisations in these countries. The still limited
relocation of formalised and specialised research activities confirms the continued
strategic importance of these activities to lead firm HQs. Substantial innovation
spaces have arisen in both India and Brazil, but these are bounded by the
strategic concerns of innovation organisers residing within Europe and the USA. 
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The cross-border decomposition of product and process development,
improvement and problem solving is much stronger in both sectors. This suggests
that lead firms tend to disperse non-research based product and service
development activities to either subsidiaries or suppliers. This does not mean that
research played no role but the emphasis was on development (it tended to be
r&D). The next chapter shows that the cross-border ODIP to Brazil and India
leads to further intra-country ODIP and how this succession of organisational
changes contributes to the build-up of innovation capabilities. ODIP creates new
spaces and the question is whether and how these new spaces are occupied.
What emerges from the next chapter is that local suppliers are taking advantage
of these opportunities and deepening their innovation capabilities. 
7 Implications for local suppliers in
Brazil and India 
The previous chapter showed the patterns of ODIP practiced by lead firms across
borders. This chapter analyses what this means for local firms in Brazil and India.
While the previous chapter took the view from above, examining ODIP patterns
and processes through the lens of the orchestrating firms, this chapter takes the
view from below, analysing how local suppliers are affected. What are the
implications for the relationships with their customers, for their role in the value
chain, and for their participation in the innovation process? 
Section 7.1 maps the ODIP relationships under study and examines knock-on
effects by concentrating on the (potential) knowledge-linkages between firms within
Brazil and India. It shows that ODIP has taken different paths in the two cases.
However, Section 7.2 shows that there are important features that are shared
between the two cases: the advancement in capability has been closely related to
the attainment of co-design contracts by supplier firms. By engaging in this type of
contract, the linkages to buyers have undergone substantial changes with the
increasing importance of uncodified information and tacit knowledge. While following
different routes, ODIP has created important learning spaces in both cases. An
important element is the nature of the knowledge centred interaction associated with
the ODIP occurring in the immediate parent firm or customer. ODIP changes the
relationships between firms in the value chain and this has the indirect effect of
contributing to the effectiveness of the interaction as a route to deepening capability.
7.1 Different ODIP paths 
7.1.1 ODIP in the Brazilian automotive industry 
In the auto industry, we can observe a sequential pattern; first there was intra-firm
cross-border ODIP which was followed by inter-firm intra-country ODIP or – to use
a different language – the outsourcing of innovation to local suppliers. This is why
Quadros (2009) argues that the more MNCs delegate innovation activities to
Brazilian affiliates, the greater is the propensity that it will draw local suppliers into
the innovation process. The increased innovation responsibility of the affiliate
creates demand for co-development and services. For example, co-development in
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MNCs in the US and Europe, but this is not yet common. 
IDS RESEARCH REPORT 73
54
cases like Arteb, Letande, Masters and Sabó means that the supplier develops the
design of the component and even provides technical solutions for problems that
need to be addressed – following the dimension and performance requirements
defined by the assembler. 
These processes are depicted in Figure 7.1. As MNC subsidiaries in Brazil – both
assemblers and suppliers – gain global mandates for product/process
development, they pass on some of the design and engineering activities to
suppliers and service providers. The cross-border decomposition of innovation
activities within firms (ODIP Type 1 and particularly ODIP Type 2, involving MNC
headquarters and subsidiaries) is closely associated with – and indeed a driver of
– the localised decomposition between firms (ODIP Type 4).and between firms
and local universities (ODIP Type 3).26
7.1.2 ODIP and the Indian software industry 
The Indian case is markedly different – see Figure 7.2. In the software industry,
the opportunities for supplier innovation typically emanate directly from
multinational and global buyers located in the US or Europe. In this case, ODIP
involves the offshore outsourcing of innovative activities to suppliers in India. It is
a case of cross-border decomposition of innovation activities between firms (ODIP
Type 4, involving MNC headquarters/buyers and Indian owned suppliers). As
Figure 7.1 Cross-border and in-country ODIP in the Brazilian auto industry
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discussed, there is also cross-border decomposition of innovation activities within
firms (ODIP Type 1 and particularly ODIP Type 2), but this creates very little
demand further in the value chain. In fact, none of the innovation events studied
involved linkages between MNC subsidiaries and Indian software suppliers. 
When linkages between MNC subsidiaries and local software firms occur these are
rarely innovation-centred. They are typically arrangements in which (i) local
suppliers receive contracts related to the installation/implementation of MNC
software products in government and private sector firms in the Indian market or
(ii) local suppliers lease out programming staff to MNCs for short periods to relieve
bottlenecks (a localised body-shopping practice known as staff supplementation).
This does not mean that ODIP does not give rise to its own dynamics within India.
On the contrary it creates and supports an important own dynamic, but the effect is
direct and occurs within firms rather than between firms. As shown by Lema
(2010), innovation outsourcing of software services in different knowledge domains
creates effective learning dynamics within firms in the supply base as they combine
knowledge and learning in different knowledge domains. The bringing together of
these knowledge streams enables the creation of ‘new combinations’ which
amounts to the deepening and application of capabilities (competence leveraging).
To a certain degree, these dynamics are akin to intra-firm ODIP because the
suppliers strengthen associated centres of excellence (CoE). However, these CoEs
and R&D departments are rarely dispersed and this is why we do not stretch the
ODIP concept to view these instances as extra-firm ODIP leading indirectly to intra-
firm ODIP. 
7.1.3 Reasons for the differences between the two sectors 
There are two interrelated reasons for these different ODIP paths. First, the local
market has played an important role in the Brazilian automotive industry. MNCs
located assembly plants in Brazil from the outset and later transferred some
innovation activities to these subsidiaries. By contrast, the local Indian market has
played an insignificant role in offshoring and outsourcing. Lead firms
Figure 7.2 ODIP and the Indian software industry
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(multinationals and global buyers) in the OECD countries worked directly with
Indian suppliers and then incorporated the software codes in products and
systems for OECD markets. The second reason is technological in nature and has
to do with sectoral product specificities. In the automotive industry, design and
production is separable as the use of computer-aided technologies has increased
the efficiency and precision of product specifications. This means that automobiles
can be split up into a multitude of parts, often with their own distinct and
specialised knowledge base (mechanics, engines, clutches, lighting, etc.) and the
lead firm increasingly concentrates on the integration of composite knowledge
(Strambach 2009). In the software industry modularisation is impeded because of
the limits of the division of labour in software design (Piore 2004). Each software
system is unique and this has limited the possibility of making interchangeable
(independent) parts and standardised interfaces; rather software systems tend to
consist of dependent modules and integration is therefore difficult. This difficulty
and the associated cost of coordination increases with the number of
organisations involved and lead firms tend to prefer to work with a single supplier
for each project (even though multi-vendor arrangements for large projects has
increased in recent years). These features of design are discussed further below. 
7.2 Buyer–supplier relations in co-design and solution development
7.2.1 Co-design in the Brazilian automotive industry
As mentioned above, auto assembler subsidiaries were expected to reproduce the
supplier choices made by the parent company but this only happened to some
extent. Brazilian subsidiaries (both assemblers and component makers) have
considerable autonomy for choosing suppliers according to competences, quality,
costs, and so on. This applies in particular when the Brazilian subsidiary is leading
the product development project. It induces the subsidiary to look for co-
development partners amongst Brazilian suppliers, either global brands with
operations in Brazil or national Brazilian suppliers. 
Brazilian national suppliers are not exclusively second tiered in the innovation
chain. Indeed, as they upgrade their innovation capabilities, OEM national
suppliers like Arteb, Lupatech and Sabó are directly involved in co-design with
assemblers’ subsidiaries. Some of the Brazilian national suppliers have taken a
further step up the ladder and are getting involved in innovation projects led by
assemblers’ headquarters or their European subsidiaries. Arteb and Lupatech
provide innovation inputs directly from Brazil to General Motors. Sabó has worked
with Volkswagen in Wolfsburg and done so via Sabó’s European subsidiary. 
Even when follow sourcing is used in Brazil, there may be downstream co-design
involved in the projects. The collaboration between Volkswagen Trucks and Buses
(assembler) and ArvinMeritor (multinational OEM supplier) exemplifies how this
unfolds. When ArvinMeritor became suspension and axle module supplier to
Volkswagen Trucks and Buses in Brazil, it also assumed the role of centre of
competence for the development of this module. Yet, as ArvinMeritor’s Brazilian
subsidiary was strong in axles and not suspensions, it mobilised Brazilian national
suppliers Suspensys, SIFCO and Freios Master to co-develop and supply
suspensions, non-tractive axles and brakes to complete the module.
27 However, it is important to add that the development of an engineering unit to provide co-development
services represents a (high) fixed cost for a manufacturer of auto-parts. Therefore, there is a size
threshold to the sustainability of engineering activities, which leaves most of the small parts
manufacturers compulsorily out of the game.
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All eight national suppliers in the sample have been heavily engaged in co-design
with their customers. In the words of SIFCO’s product development manager:
The automotive supply business has changed from supplying components to
supplying component design and manufacturing services and those who have
not understood this risk being displaced from the business.
In the past ten years, the automotive value chain in Brazil has gained in
complexity and diversity of activities, becoming also an innovation chain in which
Brazilian suppliers are included.27 This tendency to provide customised solutions
that integrate products with knowledge-intensive services (such as design) is thus
a relatively new phenomenon, but as will be explained further below it has already
changed the way in which buyers and suppliers interact. 
7.2.2 Co-design in the Indian software industry
The software industry is of course inherently solutions oriented, but co-design (as
it is done today) is also a recent trend. The practice of body-shopping started in
the 1980s but did not involve co-design at all since supplier staff worked within the
buyers’ premises on systems entirely designed by the buyer. This practice is still
widespread but decreasing. In the 1990s many buyers adopted the so-called
offshore model in which the bulk of the project is accomplished at the suppliers’
offshore development centre on the basis of tight specifications provided by the
buyer. While this includes usually some element of design, this is confined to low-
level design. However, as lead firms proceed with more advanced sourcing
strategies the separability of higher-order design processes and downstream
programming tasks becomes increasingly difficult and buyers outsource elements
of system definition as well as implementation. This means that the organisational
decomposition takes the form of ODIP Type 4, in which implementation and
requirement definition are bundled within the supplier’s domain. Suppliers are
engaged not only to create software artefacts (implementation) but also to co-
define requirements. In other words, there is a tight connection between producing
and innovating. 
Co-design is on the rise in the so-called secondary software industry, that is the IT
departments in large manufacturing and service organisations. An example is Volvo
IT, the in-house IT division of Volvo, the European auto manufacturer of trucks and
buses. In 2001, the Volvo group acquired Renault Trucks and Mack Trucks and all
IT services divisions were consolidated in Volvo IT, which had become a wholly
owned subsidiary. The new organisation was to play a new role, offering its
services in the international marketplace for software development services. In the
same year, the organisation initiated a competitive-sourcing programme and
established relationships with suppliers in Poland and India, in order to reduce
costs, speed up deliveries and learn from skilled partners. The outsourcing practice
grew rapidly and the customer base expanded beyond the capacity of the
28 The ‘vision’ is a key artefact produced during the problem identification/inception stage of software
projects.
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organisation; it was therefore clear that a strategy of internal competence transition
was needed. This strategy had two main elements. First, Volvo IT needed to
establish a new role for the organisation, one that was closer to the customer and
with more of the deliveries managed by suppliers. Second, it needed internal
employees to move up the value chain: ‘out of the technical areas and over to the
business side of things’ – in the words of the head of global sourcing. 
Over time, the Indian supplier MindTree has become closely involved in the
outsourced projects, including complex tasks in the software development life
cycle. It no longer merely develops systems to Volvo’s specifications, but also
participates in the development of those specifications by finding resolutions to
user requests. In many cases, the buyer needs to draw the supplier into the ‘vision’
of the project because of the limited ability of buyers to codify requirements at this
stage.28 These requirements are defined collectively based on the knowledge that
each firm brings to the table. For instance, MindTree was able to draw on its
experience of developing CRM systems for customers in other industrial domains
and could use this ‘generic knowledge’ in the Volvo project. This type of division of
labour is typical for distributed projects in the context of organisationally
decomposed innovation. The two companies approach the requirement-definition
phase from two different ends. The buyer’s core competence is typically in the user
domain (automotive industry in this example) and in the relationships with end-
users. The supplier typically has previous experience of building different types of
generic solutions (e.g. CRM, ERP, MIS) on a variety of technology platforms.
Working together from these two different ends, solutions are designed collectively,
drawing on distinct competence profiles of the firms.
In the software industry, co-design arises because of ‘system ignorance’, at least
in the key initial stages of software projects. Either the design is not worked out
yet at the point in which the supplier is engaged or the design is impossible to
work out until the system is complete. At the initial stages the buyer and the
supplier will deploy ‘software architects’ but as emphasised by Piore (2004)
‘architecture is more like a living organism’ in software, very unlike a builder’s
blueprint. Software projects are non-repeatable by definition and high-level
architectures are fluid. This contrasts with the auto-industry in which high-level
architectures are relatively fixed and design changes more bounded within this
structure. Nevertheless, vehicle design is becoming increasingly complex as the
technology develops and there are still key interdependencies in vehicle design
architectures as changes in one component will have knock effects on other
components (Novak and Wernerfelt 2006).
7.3 The nature of knowledge centred interaction
7.3.1 Knowledge centred interaction in the Brazilian automotive industry 
The increasing complexity of design in the automotive industry and the
shortcomings of codification efforts mean that buyers and suppliers in the Brazilian
automotive industry have formed closer relationships in recent years. This differs
29 This was the initial experience of Arteb, Lupatech, Fras-le and Sabó, as presented in section 4. It was
also the initial experience of firms like Metal Leve and Cofap, which were pioneers in terms of
upgrading innovation capabilities to the advanced level. As seen in section 4, Metal Leve and the
piston rings division of Cofap were eventually acquired by Mahle, whereas the shock absorber division
of Cofap was acquired by the Brazilian operation of Magneti Marelli.
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markedly from earlier decades when the automotive industry in Brazil was almost
exclusively a manufacturing operation. Assemblers and OEM suppliers located in
the country used product and process designs elaborated by their respective
headquarters. Some Brazilian national suppliers also entered the chain, based on
product/process designs licensed from MNC suppliers.29 Under such circumstances,
there was little innovation activity in developing country sites (in both assemblers
and their OEM suppliers) and therefore little need for co-development with locally
owned suppliers and engineering services providers. The same applied to the
interactions between assembler subsidiaries and Brazilian national OEM suppliers,
which drew on product licenses. When product and process development is almost
exclusively located in developed country R&D centres, knowledge flows are
unidirectional from headquarters’ R&D towards developing country subsidiaries, for
both assemblers and key suppliers. However, ODIP changes this pattern as seen in
the sampled firms. The flow of technical information has become thicker and more
diversified as a share of product development has been relocated in Brazil – in the
first decade of the new century. The exchange of codified and tacit knowledge has
become strong and bi directional. 
7.3.2 Knowledge centred interaction in the Indian software industry
This trajectory observed in Brazil is not unlike that of the sampled suppliers in the
Indian software industry. To be sure, information exchange between Indian firms
and their customers extended well beyond price and requirements already in the
1990s. Large amounts of information flowed back and forth. Multiple site visits in
the early 2000s confirmed that offshore development staff had online access to
the customers’ information repositories and were able to retrieve ‘real-time’ design
specifications, appraisals and other production related information (Lema and
Hesbjerg 2003). The linkages between local firms and their customers, however,
could not appropriately be described as ‘thick’ and based on tacit knowledge. All
projects were made to highly specified requirements and were delivered with
detailed codified documentation, enabling other firms to fix and develop the
software further if and when needed. Because of the limited degree of tacit
knowledge embedded in most of these relationships ‘switching costs’ were
reduced (Lema 2009a: 70). However, this changes once specifications and design
are co-defined. This is an interaction-intensive process characterised by high
complexity and tacit knowledge. The buyer–supplier interface is therefore
substantially thicker in this type of project, compared to implementation projects in
which processes are easy to codify. In end-to-end CAD outsourcing, the project-
based relationship is typically of a long duration in which the engagement period
can last several years. Certain phases tend to be face-to-face intensive and
suppliers often post personnel to the buyer premises on a semi-permanent basis.
Thus, in most cases, software analysts and architects are stationed at the
customer’s premises. Together with the customers, they plan the overall design of
30 The national suppliers which managed to master high-level product development activities (Arteb,
Lupatech and Sabó) and the few MNC subsidiaries which have become centres of technological
competence (Mahle and Sachs), have significantly drawn on cooperative arrangements with Brazilian
universities to compensate for their lack of technological infrastructure and internal research capabilities. 
31 The major programmes of collaboration for technology support and advanced product development
comprised: Lupatech with Materials Science Lab of UFSC; Arteb with Unicamp and UFSCar; Sabó
with Unicamp, UFSCar, IPEN and CTA; and Fras-le and UFRGS.
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the system and the underlying project. In Volvo IT they have asked MindTree to
post their customer account manager within the Volvo IT organisation and this
manager has an office literally next door to the head of global sourcing in Volvo
IT. While this is an exceptional example, there is a clear tendency to increase the
investment in relationship management. 
Our case studies thus provide some insights into the characteristics of relational
linkages (Gereffi et al. 2005) in the context of the global decomposition of
innovation activities. Some of the literature expects durable ties to be a
prerequisite for these types of linkages. However, the interviews suggest that
transfer of tacit knowledge is episodic and bounded in time and space. In the
software outsourcing industry, it is achieved by establishing offices near the
customers and/or frequent air travel and video links. While it is true that inter-
organisational learning is more difficult in an international context than in a purely
domestic setting – due to geographical and cultural distance – the difficulties
seem to be diminishing. Return migration (Saxenian 2004; Vang and Overby
2006) does not seem to play a major role. While international working experience
and cognitive affinity is important, there is no evidence of return migrants playing
an important role in the sampled innovative projects. 
7.4 Suppliers replicating external ODIP
We found that suppliers are replicating external ODIP in their own countries which
is important for understanding the depth of the redistribution of innovation
activities. Particularly interesting is that they are using university research
competence in order to complement their own.30 The challenging mandate from
their customers induces the suppliers to do so. In this respect, the Brazilian case
has given more findings than the Indian case. It thus follows the identified pattern
in which the automotive industry follows an ODIP path that has more
organisational layers (see section 7.1). 
One of the most interesting knock-on effects of ODIP, which came out as findings
from the Brazilian case, is local suppliers replicating ODIP as a consequence of
the challenges they face due to having entered the co-design chain. Arteb,
Lupatech, Sabó and Fras-le are sampled firms that have turned to Brazilian
universities in order to source the research capacity that they lacked internally31
(ODIP type 3). Lupatech and Sabó have gone further and explored patented
inventions which have been developed by Brazilian universities. This suggests
that local research institutions have had an important role, at least in the initial
phases of ODIPing, in which local firms are climbing the ladder from NPD
capabilities to technological research capabilities. 
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It is important to add here that – over time – such Brazilian owned suppliers
underwent significant changes in their sourcing of technological knowledge. Our
case studies show that technology transfer from a foreign company – either in the
form of a license agreement or in the form of a joint venture – was the common
starting point in every case (Quadros 2009). Yet, these four Brazilian suppliers
have progressively turned to relying more on their own technological
experimentation and NPD learning than on technology transfer. In this trajectory,
sourcing knowledge and R&D skills from universities seems to have been a
critical decision. 
These university centres were able to engage in contract research for the auto-
parts industry because of their own history of accumulating capabilities in very
specialised fields such as materials engineering (comprising metals, polymers and
tribology), mechanical engineering, chemical engineering and metallurgy. And
local suppliers look for their contribution in order to overcome their technology
knowledge limitations. The typical situation is one in which problems arise either
from the need to improve and adapt components or from new technology
development. Solutions require technological knowledge, which is currently
beyond the capabilities of the firm’s product development team. Thus, in such
contracts research groups work as if they were a supplement to the R&D
corporation lab. 
7.5 Conclusion
In order to understand how ODIP affects the build-up of innovation capabilities in
Brazil and India, this chapter sought to understand the process – and not just the
result – of decomposing the innovation process. We have seen substantial
differences between our two cases – mainly due to sectoral differences rather than
country differences. In the automotive case, there is a sequential pattern of intra-
company cross-border ODIP first, followed by inter-company country-internal ODIP.
The local auto-parts suppliers in Brazil tend to link up with the Brazilian subsidiaries
of multinational assemblers or first-tier suppliers. They are not directly associated
with the initial ODIP. Moreover, such local suppliers have been increasingly turning
to research collaboration with local universities in order to source scientists and
laboratories which can strengthen their NPD and technological innovation
capabilities. In India, local suppliers typically deal directly with buyers located in
Europe or the USA and are directly affected by their ODIP decisions. 
While the process differs, the outcome for local suppliers is the same. In both
cases, they become deeply involved in co-design. In both cases, this has
occurred through a transformation of relationships with their customers.
Information flows have become thicker and bi-directional, both sides bring tacit
knowledge to the table. The innovation is often the result of integrating the
customer’s vertical and the supplier’s horizontal competency. 
But innovation does not follow automatically. ODIP creates an opportunity for
suppliers; it opens up a space which suppliers can occupy. Taking advantage of
this opportunity and occupying this space is only possible for suppliers who have
already accumulated certain capabilities and are able to make the required
investments in people, equipment, organisation and relationships. In other words,
32 On the ‘demand side’ it depended centrally on factors discussed earlier: changes in innovation
strategies and lead firm restructuring. 
IDS RESEARCH REPORT 73
62
the new innovation capabilities – if they do arise – cannot be attributed entirely to
ODIP. Other ways of building capabilities – prior to ODIP – played a role.
Quantifying their relative contribution is never possible but understanding the
dynamics which lead to the build-up of innovation capabilities is possible. The
next chapter takes us a step further in that direction. 
8 Directions of causality and
contingent factors
The core question of this research is whether and how the organisational
decomposition of innovation in Europe and the USA influenced the deepening of
innovation capabilities in the two industries in Brazil and India. The case material
from both Brazil and India suggests that there is a strong connection between
ODIP and innovation capability even though it is impossible to quantify this
influence. This section reflects further on the causal connection, highlighting
contingent factors and questioning the direction of causality. 
In section 8.1 we suggest that the influence of ODIP in the old powers on
innovation capability in the new powers was not automatic. It depended on a
concurrence of circumstances. On the ‘supply side’ in Brazil and India it depended
centrally on deliberate effort and investment in innovation capability.32 This was a
key contingent variable which is important to include in a comprehensive
discussion of how ODIP ‘worked’. 
In section 8.2 we go a step further and suggest that ODIP only created new
opportunities where previous capability building had already occurred. This point
is not trivial. It raises questions about the direction of causality between lead firm
ODIP practices and the formation of capabilities in subsidiary units and supplier
firms. Our key point is that the direction of causality is not one way. Our interviews
suggest that capability building in Brazil and India seems to have affected ODIP
decisions in lead firm headquarters. Initially, the emerging availability of credible
and technologically competent partners and subsidiary firms in Brazil and India
contributed to ODIP as a viable practice. Over time, the strengthening of
capabilities (reinforced by ODIP) played a key role in deepening and accelerating
the process. In short, the causal relationship is not only circular, but also
cumulative. 
These elements of the analysis extend the focus beyond the core question of our
paper. We cannot examine the circular nature of causality to the full extent, nor
can we examine the entire multitude of contingent variables that influence the
relationship between ODIP and capability building. Rather, our aim in this chapter
is more modest: to provide insights from the case studies regarding the factors
which seem most important. This qualifies some of our main arguments in this
paper and it opens up interesting avenues for new research.
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8.1 Turning opportunity into reality
The main argument in this section is that there is no automaticity in ODIP
generating innovation capability. The interviews suggest that deliberate effort and
investment is required in order to exploit the opportunities opened up by ODIP.
Such active efforts affected the firms’ and subsidiaries’ ability to exploit the market
spaces and learning spaces opened up by ODIP. In the course of addressing
these opportunities the firms further invested in and benefited from the leveraging
of capabilities with multiple customers inside and outside the country.
8.1.1 Internal investments in people, equipment, organisation and relationships
While ODIP opened up opportunity spaces, the exploitation of these spaces
depended on investments in capability. This required internal investment in assets
such as people, equipment, organisation and relationships.
In the Brazilian sample firms such investment was substantial. As an example
Fras-le created its own R&D lab which it organised and staffed, stepping up R&D
investment and speeding its learning process. On average, Fras-le spent 3 per
cent of net revenues in R&D annually, in the past four years prior to fieldwork.
Similarly, Metal Leve, before acquisition by Mahle, invested heavily in building
laboratories, hiring and training engineers and researchers. Already in the early
1990s, Metal Leve’s R&D staff totalled 230 professionals. This helps explain
technological learning in Metal Leve and the success first in exports, and later as
an international producer. 
The typical situation in which concrete instances of learning unfolded was one in
which an improvement in a given component requires technological knowledge,
which is currently beyond the capabilities of the firm’s product development team
(either in a national or multinational corporation). Central labs are often too busy
attending to the corporation’s priorities and cannot afford to dedicate the time the
Brazilian subsidiary requires. In the case of Brazilian national suppliers, the
explanation is similar, with the difference that there is no central lab to turn to and
problems arise either from the adaptation of licensed technologies or from new
technology development, as illustrated in the cases of Lupatech and Fras-le in this
research. Such active efforts of investing in learning and sourcing knowledge was
important for exploiting the new mandates and spaces.
In the Indian software industry, Lema (2009b) suggests that learning from lead firms
and buyers was important but insufficient alone. Innovation capability formation
depended on other channels and mechanisms outside and/or independent of
outsourcing relationships. Supplier firms drew significantly on their own resources in
order to innovate. Although buyer firms were involved in creating new spaces they
were only partially involved in providing the critical inputs for their exploitation – and
in any case this provision of inputs was necessary but not sufficient for capability
building. Exploiting new spaces involved significant active effort in supplier firms that
often worked through channels that were independent of outsourcing relationships. 
Examination of innovation events in the Indian firms showed that in many cases,
the sources of knowledge were results of traceable investment decisions made by
management or dedicated innovation groups/initiatives. The latter includes
33 Product development software services firms (PDSS) tend to depend more on R&D.
34 In conceptual terms, the emphasis on investment in learning is relevant to note in relation to the general
idea of ‘taking advantage’ of the opportunity opened up by ODIP. Exploiting this opportunity requires the
supplier or subsidiary to have a significant element of the capability for undertaking the activity.
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investments in such things as the creation of new artefacts (concept papers, proof
of concept models), in training and hiring of recruits with specialist skills and/or in
the facilitation of workshops, special interest groups, etc.
In the services space, some firms have established and invested in dedicated
R&D units but overall they tended to rely on other forms of knowledge creation.
InFlux in Infosys (see section 5.2.3) was based on activities undertaken within
SETLab (Software Engineering and Technology Laboratory), the main R&D
department in Infosys. However, as is typical of business process software
services (BPSS), this was a fuzzier version of R&D activity (Miles 2007).33
8.1.2 Learning with multiple clients 
Investment in innovation assets was seemingly a central contingent variable that
needed to be in place for ODIP to unfold.34 However, our circumstantial evidence
also suggests that further investment and effort was necessary. Particularly
important was active management aimed at integrating competences from across
distinct customer business units. In effect, the firms managed to leverage
competences across multiple clients, in particular overseas clients. 
In Brazil, the expansion of auto suppliers abroad helped these firms to exploit
ODIP at home. In other words, the increasing international presence of the
suppliers observed for this research seems to have gone hand in hand with their
mounting role as providers of innovative solutions. As we shall explain, there are
several reasons for this. 
The Brazilian case studies show that the degree of internationalisation is a variable
that helps to understand the differences in the innovation capability evolution of the
suppliers controlled by Brazilian nationals. The national suppliers who have
advanced most in innovation capabilities are the ones whose growth strategies
include the global market: Sabó, Lupatech, Arteb and the Randon group (particularly
in the case of Fras-le). By mobilising financial, human and institutional resources in
order to develop the innovation capabilities required to compete globally, these firms
have undergone not only a process of technological learning but also of business
learning. Arguably, it is this type of increased business understanding combined with
technological competence that provides a passport to ODIP. 
However, internationalisation is also necessary in relation to ‘filling’ the spaces
created by ODIP. In the case of Mahle Metal Leve, the customer in Germany
(BMW) required that the Brazilian supplier sought collaboration with European and
North American universities with which BMW have had experience in partnership
in the specific field. This poses a new type of problem regarding the involvement
of Brazilian research institutions in ODIPing processes driven by MNCs. To what
extent do R&D networks built by MNC headquarters and involving research
institutions in Europe or the US, constitute a barrier to their subsidiaries’ building
35 In the context of ODIP, there are two aims of the internationalisation process that are particularly
relevant, the development of relational capabilities and the deepening of technical knowledge and
capabilities. Both of these are associated partly with fluid internationalisation based on air travel and
the temporary shift of base for leading projects staff. This was discussed as ‘the nature of knowledge
centred interaction’ in section 7.3. However, the largest suppliers have gone beyond this with
permanent internationalisation through greenfield FDI (typically market-seeking front-end offices in
OECD countries) and overseas acquisitions (such as Infosys’s competence-seeking acquisition of
Expert Information Services in Australia).
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R&D networks with local research institutions? The fact that most Brazilian
subsidiaries which have extended mandates to include R&D activities are
engaged in NPD, but not in technological research, would suggest that this tends
to be a limitation difficult to be overcome. R&D in such subsidiaries is usually
carried out by NPD engineers with little research training. Even when they are
interested in establishing links with local research, they may fail for lacking the
necessary knowledge to approach scientific institutions. 
Internationalisation was also important in the Indian software industry. While the
methods of internationalisation have differed to some extent, the capturing of
innovation spaces has been closely associated with the very concrete efforts of
internationalisation, as is apparent in many of the innovation events. The
development of new capabilities has arguably also been dependent on increased
global presence. The largest companies have become global corporations that
can match the global presence of their customers. The importance of such
linkages has driven foreign investments and the acquisitions by foreign firms.
Acquisitions were often major enablers in the innovation processes behind the
events examined for this research. Knowledge brought in from the outside often
made a significant contribution; it would have been difficult to develop it in-house
or without close linkages to technology shapers.35
More broadly, the software case suggests that cross-border linkages (as opposed
to overseas investments) gave rise to competence leveraging which utilised the
multi-client environment in which ODIP unfolded. Lema (2009b) distinguished
explicitly between (i) the emergence of new opportunity spaces, and (ii) the
processes by which suppliers ‘mobilise’ and combine resources to fill them. The
material suggests that the integration of internal and external inputs for addressing
new spaces was not trivial. The combination of external and firm-internal as well
as buyer/client-driven and ‘other’ inputs/resources was critical and tended to go
hand in hand in the learning process. This blending process is inevitably one that
occurs within firms in the supply base and one that needs to be actively managed.
The changing demand conditions and reconfiguration of value chains did not
transpire into a ‘benign escalator’ for supply-base firms. 
Indian suppliers learnt to continuously cross-feed knowledge and experience from
one project to another through the implementation of comprehensive knowledge
management systems. These software firms became project based organisations,
able to enter continuous cycles of extraction (harvesting), development and
application of knowledge in projects in the same area. However, learning over
time was augmented by a particular dynamism arising from the leveraging of
competences across projects situated in different vertical knowledge domains (for
36 This suggests that ODIP is potentially a channel for adding to existing capabilities in subsidiaries and
suppliers in India and Brazil. This is to be contrasted with the creation of capabilities. We suggest that
ODIP facilitated the deepening (not the creation) of innovation capabilities. 
37 There are only three exceptions, Letande, Freios Master and Suspensys. 
38 We refer here to the cases of ArvinMeritor/Rockwell-Braseixos, ZF Sachs/BorgWarner and Mahle
Metal Leve.
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example, the automotive industry or the financial industry) and horizontal
knowledge domains (different types of IT systems such as ERP or CRM software).
This combination of knowledge gave the Indian firms an advantage in supplying
innovative services in the global market. They do not dilute their core capabilities
by operating in multiple business lines; rather the leveraging of knowledge and
experience across these business lines became a core capability in itself. 
8.2 Directions of causality 
In this section, we extend the timescale to show that significant capabilities
existed before or simultaneously with the changing lead-firm practices.36 This
raises the question of whether and how this build-up of capabilities in Brazil and
India has induced ODIP on the part of lead firms in the Europe and the USA. 
8.2.1 History matters: capability building before ODIP
Any understanding of ‘ODIP causality’ is significantly influenced by the timescale
that is considered. This subsection starts by going back in time and emphasises
the pre-existing capabilities in Brazil and India before ODIP began to unfold. The
effects of ODIP decisions taken in the US and Europe did not parachute onto
virgin territory in Brazil and India. Rather ODIP was a key mechanism of adding to
and deepening capabilities in the two industries in Brazil and India.
Extending the time period helps to grasp the dynamics and direction of causality
between organisational decomposition and the formation of capabilities. Most
cases of capability building in the Brazilian auto-parts industry are stories of 25
years or more of gradual learning and accumulation of design competencies
(Quadros 2009).37 Drawing on chapter 5, it is interesting to note that, in the early
1990s, most firms of the sample had already attained the capability of carrying out
application development. Sabó had already mastered variant development. Also
the MNC’s subsidiaries investigated benefited from previous processes of
technological learning that occurred under previous national ownership.38 From
this perspective it seems plausible that the previous innovative capability attained
by the sample firms motivated MNCs to extend ODIP to Brazil. 
All seven firms in the group of advanced innovation capabilities have gone
through long trajectories of technological learning and undergone previous stages
of technological capabilities. Some, as in the cases of ArvinMeritor (formerly
Rockwell), Bosch and ZF Sachs, are MNC subsidiaries that, since the 1980s,
have systemically pursued capabilities in new product development and increased
their product engineering areas. They have started by searching for incremental
product changes, mostly designed to meet local market needs: adapting
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components to requirements of local biofuels or using local minerals for new
formulations of friction materials. In the case of Mahle Metal Leve, the foreign
corporation (Mahle) which has taken over the well-known Brazilian suppliers of
power-train components Metal Leve and Cofap, benefited from their two decades
of gradual building of capabilities. Moreover, the basis of knowledge and
capabilities acquired from Metal Leve and Cofap has been the platform on which
Mahle has raised its Brazilian Technological Centre, which is one of the five
centres of Mahle’s global R&D network. 
The same applies to the Brazilian national suppliers. Sabó has reached its current
level of capabilities after decades of capability building. In the early 1960s, Sabó set
about creating its own R&D lab. In the 1970s, the company dedicated engineering
efforts to design mechanical equipment to be used in manufacturing, thus developing
competencies in metallurgy and mechanics, which was revealed to be critical when
the decision was taken to develop proprietary products to supply European
customers. This was a critical resource behind its internationalisation trajectory. 
Even though it is younger and smaller than Sabó, Lupatech has also systemically
pursued moving up the ladder of innovation competencies, since its foundation in
the early 1980s. Lupatech’s trajectory started with the transfer of foreign steel
powder injection technology. However, in the 2000s Lupatech invested substantially
in developing a new, proprietary sintering technology, with support from Brazilian
university research. This move was important to differentiate its services, and
helped open up the North American automotive market for Lupatech. In addition to
the Brazilian plant, Lupatech operates plants in Argentina and the US. Arteb, the
Brazilian supplier of light systems, has had a similar trajectory up to reaching the
level of developing proprietary process technologies, in the 2000s. From its
beginning, in the 1950s, Arteb has counted on technology transfer from Hella, the
German supplier of lights. This was a long-term partnership, since Hella licensed
the VW Beetle lights to Arteb and acquired a small stake in the Brazilian supplier.
After investing continuously in product/process technology learning, Arteb attained
the competencies to develop incremental product changes and advanced process
changes. In the early 2000s, prompted by the opportunities opened up by North
American customers (GM US, for instance), Arteb decided to abandon the
technology license agreement with Hella, which hindered its entry in non-Latin
American markets. In order to compensate for this, Arteb stepped up its R&D
activities, by creating its own and independent Arteb Technological Centre. 
A remarkable point in the cases above is that the building of innovation
capabilities has been concentrated in a few technological domains, the most
significant of which are materials engineering (comprising metals, polymers and
tribology), mechanical engineering, chemical engineering and metallurgy. 
This longer term perspective (taking account of a period of 20 or 30 years) underlines
that the building of innovative capability was a process that started before the
introduction of decomposed innovation practices by lead firms. It also suggests that
this prior learning played a role in the decisions of MNC assemblers and suppliers to
involve Brazilian subsidiaries and national suppliers in innovation activities. 
Few studies of the Indian software industry have traced the evolution of the
industry back to its roots. The few studies that adopt a historical perspective are
39 The first large scale software projects in India were public sector undertakings originally dealing with
computer hardware, such as Electronics Corporation of India Limited (ECIL) and Computer
Maintenance Corporation (CMC). These were part of a very small number of firms with software
activities in India in the late 1970s – the time when IBM was ‘forced’ out of India due to new equity
rules. Only a few computers were allowed to be imported and most of them were from the Soviet
Union. CMC had a monopoly on the servicing of these foreign systems. However, unlike joint ventures
such as Tata-Boroughs, these state-run firms did not scout for the export markets. 
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primarily concerned with the policy dimension (Evans 1992; Heeks 1996; Lema
and Hesbjerg 2003). However, it is interesting to note that the current giants of the
industry – Infosys, Tata Consultancy Services, Wipro – are also some of the
oldest firms in the industry and they have all been producing software for more
than 30 years. Infosys is a little younger (established in 1981), but this firm was
founded by a breakaway group of Patni Computer Systems (established 1979),
one of the early private sector players. While most initial software development
activity in India was undertaken in the public sector,39 the initial software
development capability in the current giants grew out of demand from the Indian
private manufacturing sector. Both Tata and Wipro were industry and trade
conglomerates; and software development arose in services units catering for the
IT needs of the manufacturing arms of these industry houses. Only later did they
begin to address software demand from other customers. 
The work of these firms outside India began with ‘body-shopping’, i.e. the
transportation of software professionals to work at the buyer’s premises overseas.
In the late 1980s, body shopping was the primary mode of software exports. The
managers of Indian software firms interviewed for this research pointed out that
this mode of software outsourcing was very conducive to fast customer-oriented
and problem-focused learning. While often frowned upon as low value-added
work, the onsite ‘body-shopping’ model that characterised software ‘outsourcing’ in
the 1980s gave Indian suppliers access to opportunities for an in-depth
understanding of required customer needs, project management practices and
business routines and pressures. While many sectors in developing countries
have been disadvantaged by a lack of access to tacit knowledge about required
products/services and organisational best practices in lead markets (Altenburg
2006), this did not apply to the Indian software industry. It is sometimes
overlooked that there was a continued substantial presence of Indian software
professionals working onsite in customer markets, even as more work was shifted
offshore to India during the 1990s. There is still a presence of onsite personnel,
but it has taken on a new knowledge-creating role.
From a learning perspective, the Indian software industry of the 1990s can be
divided into two segments. The first and largest segment was devoted to the
development of software to customers’ specifications (services). The second and
smaller segment was concerned with the development of own software packages.
This did not thrive because Indian firms did not have the skills necessary to make
products that were commercially viable in the international market. Unlike the
services segment, they were detached from advanced users. In the 2000s they
therefore began to address the independent software vendor market by offering
their development capabilities instead. Their line of business became known as
outsourced product development (OPD) and they could draw on capabilities
40 Take the case of the ETL tool that was developed by Aztecsoft but acquired and marketed by
California-based Embarcadero Technologies. The buyer was not actively seeking to expand its product
portfolio but was unexpectedly offered this product. After the transfer of the license, the two firms
initiated a relationship akin to own design manufacturing (ODM). The buyer became responsible for
sales and marketing whereas the supplier became responsible for product roadmap development and
all technical and managerial functions related to subsequent versions of the product. 
41 Swedish economist and Nobel laureate Gunnar Myrdal coined the ‘term circular cumulative causation’
in his seminal work ‘The Asian Drama’. He suggested that: ‘circular causation will give rise to a
cumulative movement only when [. . .] a change in one of the conditions will ultimately be followed by
a feed-back of secondary impulses [. . .] big enough not only to sustain the primary change, but to
push it further. Mere mutual causation is not enough to create this process.’ (Myrdal 1968: 1875) 
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acquired from previous experimentation with product development. In this sense,
the supply side contributed to new types of outsourcing (or rather the outsourcing
of new functions) in this segment. 40 More generally, such learning on the part of
Indian firms contributed to ODIP which in turn opened up new possibilities for
acquiring innovation capabilities. 
While this paper has not concentrated on the historical evolution of these two
industries, the above observations highlight the need to go further back in time if
we want to establish causal connections between ODIP in OECD countries and
capability building in Brazil and India. ODIP only created new opportunities where
previous capability building had occurred. More detailed historical research would
need to examine whether one can go as far as distinguishing an ‘initial and
igniting feedback effect’, to be contrasted with a ‘later and deepening feedback
effect’. While the emergence of ODIP is rooted in a myriad of factors that are
difficult to untangle, it is easier to specify the feedback effect in the deepening of
ODIP. We discuss this next. 
8.2.2 Circular and cumulative causation
The observed learning over time is significant for the main question addressed in
this report. Add to this the observation – arising from both the auto and software
case material – that lead firms sometimes ‘take what’s on offer’. In combination,
these findings suggest that the unfolding of ODIP was not a one-way street. It was
not only influenced by general changes in business strategy and innovation
practices in lead firms, but also by the development of increasing innovative
capability in the supply base. As discussed above, the increasing capabilities in
subsidiary and supplier firms in Brazil and India contributed to the emergence of
the ODIP strategy. Over time, it then deepened and accelerated the ODIP
process, reinforcing the initial impulse. This means that the causal relationship
was not only bi-directional (or circular), it was also cumulative.41
Much of the literature on offshoring/outsourcing by multinationals and lead firm
buyers tends to assume (often implicitly) that the impetus comes from the demand
side. Buyers make decisions about location of innovative work, whereas
subsidiaries and suppliers merely respond to these decisions. While it is true that
lead firms ultimately decide whether and to what extent innovative tasks are
located in low-cost economies, our research suggests that the supply base has an
important influence on these decisions. 
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In the software industry, interviews with buyers indicate that these supplier
capabilities mattered. The case material indicates that the adoption of open
business models by buyers and the resulting outsourcing of innovation activities
were directly influenced by the attainment of general and customer specific
capabilities by suppliers. The data show that increasing capabilities and
competence leveraging (as described above) had important feedback effects.
Some of these feedback linkages were direct and relationship specific. Others
were indirect, affecting the incentives for outsourcing in general and opening up
new options for offshoring advanced activities in cost-effective ways. This ‘own’
dynamic not only accelerates outsourcing, it also changes the very notion of what
outsourcing is about. It has induced immense organisational change whereby
lead firms have been rethinking mission statements and operating models. 
It helps to distinguish between direct and indirect feedback mechanisms. Direct
feedback mechanisms transmit in a straight line between suppliers and buyers, as
the former develops customer-specific competences and the comfort levels of the
latter rises. This widens the range of options for further outsourcing at the
unilateral level. Indirect feedback mechanisms are the external effects of
increasing supplier capabilities at the multilateral level. These create new options
for the ‘demand base’ as a whole. This means that openness and outsourcing
that are initially practised by only a few firms may therefore set in motion a co-
evolutionary process, in which supply and demand are recursively moving
towards higher-level, more advanced innovation activities at the aggregate level.
Lema (2010) discussed buyer business models and their ‘opening’ and argued
that such openness was not only driven ‘from above’. Buyers, when defining their
business model, were significantly influenced, by the changing outsourcing
landscape in Bangalore. In some case studies, respondents’ information
suggested that the opening of business models were directly influenced by the
attainment of general and customer specific capabilities by suppliers. This was
particularly important when shifting gear in business model opening. The supply
side dynamics and issues related to linkages and trust were particularly important
in cases of ‘advanced’ outsourcing in a ‘second stage’ of openness. 
Similarly, in the research on the Brazilian automotive industry, Quadros (2009)
suggested that learning has an important implication for the understanding and
theoretical modelling of ODIP processes because it suggests that not only the
dynamics in OECD countries influences ODIP. Also the endogenous processes of
technological learning, which happen in countries like Brazil, have an influence on
the decision-making processes at firm level related to ODIP. The increase in the
general capability level is forging an attractive environment for ODIP in Brazil. An
important conclusion that comes out from this case is that the forces, the
momentum and the learning processes from the South are as important as is the
momentum from the North.
In the initial set-up of the questions about ODIP addressed in this paper, the role
attributed to MNCs as drivers of ODIP was emphasised. This reflects the fact that the
Brazilian industry is now much more internationalised than it was 20 years ago. Yet,
this research suggests that the long process of accumulating capabilities in both
Brazilian subsidiaries of MNC suppliers and Brazilian national suppliers has been a
critical factor in explaining their increasing importance in the global value chain.
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It is more than their response to the ODIP moves coming from MNCs’
headquarters or subsidiaries in OECD countries. The contribution of Brazilian
MNC subsidiaries and of Brazilian national suppliers to ODIP starts before the
ODIP movement from the OECD country firms and goes beyond such movement.
As the material suggests, the entry of Brazilian subsidiaries in their corporations’
global R&D networks has not happened as a decision from headquarters in order
to build innovation capabilities, but the other way round. In the cases of Bosch,
Mahle Metal Leve and of ZF Sachs, Brazilian subsidiaries’ innovation capabilities
have developed over a considerable period of time, and before the model of a
global R&D network had diffused. Their attainment of a certain level of
technological competency has been critical for them to be recognised as
significant assets in a globalising economy. 
8.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter we suggested that innovation capability building and deepening is
not an automatic outcome of ODIP. ODIP created a space but the effective
exploitation of that space involved a significantly active effort on the part of firms
in India and Brazil. We also suggested that the causal connection between ODIP
is not one way. In fact, it is difficult to pinpoint where it all started. We suggested
that technological learning and the formation of innovative capabilities preceded or
concurred with the decomposition of innovation by lead firms in both sectors. The
decision-making process in lead firms is not only guided by pressures and
opportunities in OECD countries but also by the new innovation capabilities that
have been developed in Brazil and India. In this way, the suppliers and
subsidiaries have been important in accelerating ODIP and the global
redistribution of innovation capability.
9 Conclusion
This final chapter summarises the main findings, indicates advances to the
literature and reflects on the future distribution of innovation activities between old
and rising powers. 
9.1 Summary of findings
The main findings emerging from our in-depth research on the Brazilian auto
industry and Indian software industry are as follows.
z Dynamics of change. We started with the recognition that a shift in the
distribution of innovation power from the old powers to the rising powers is
underway and that many factors have contributed to this shift. Most of the
literature has concentrated on the factors within the rising powers. This report
has examined how the old powers themselves are contributing to this shift. It
concentrated on the organisational decomposition of the innovation process
(ODIP) in Europe and the USA and asked how ODIP has affected the
accumulation of innovation capabilities in Brazil and India. In addressing this
question, it provided new insights to the literature on the changing geography
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of innovation in the global economy (Bruche 2009; Ernst 2009; Fifarek and
Veloso 2010; Mudambi 2008) by unravelling the dynamics of those changes
which emanate from the old powers. 
z Advanced innovation capabilities in Brazil and India. The literature on both
the Brazilian auto industry (Cassiolato et al. 2001; Humphrey et al. 2000;
Salerno et al. 2003) and on the Indian software industry (Arora 2006;
Chaminade and Vang 2008; D’Costa 2009) has tended to be pessimistic with
regard to the attainment of local innovative capability. This is not what we
found. Subsidiaries and independent suppliers were involved in advanced
innovation capabilities: they engaged not only in ‘applied’ development, but
also in ‘systemic’ development of products and services. In the Brazilian auto
industry, subsidiaries of multinationals and local suppliers have attained
capabilities based on R&D. In the Indian software industry, foreign and local
suppliers have proven capabilities in high-level design. Yet, much of this Indian
innovation remains hidden and is overlooked in R&D-centric studies. 
z Time or method? How can such contrast in understanding be explained? Do
the differences between our findings and those of previous literature stem from
the changes being very recent or are they due to distinctive research
methods? It seems that both reasons contribute to the difference. Our
research is based on a robust but intentional sample of the vanguard and thus
it is not statistically representative either of the Brazilian automotive or the
Indian software industries. However, our methodological choice of in-depth
investigation of significant innovation events involving customers and suppliers
has allowed the unravelling of new findings that so far have been overlooked.
Second, this report and related publications (Lema 2009b, 2010; and Quadros
2009) have documented that the build-up of innovation capabilities in both
cases has been accelerating in recent years. The real world is changing fast. 
z The importance of ODIP. Explanation of the Indian and Brazilian advances in
innovation capabilities needs to include ODIP and its effects. Lead firms
headquartered in the USA and Germany have reorganised their value chains
and delegated major innovation functions to their subsidiaries and to
independent suppliers in Brazil and India. We examined how and under what
conditions firms in Brazil and India have occupied the new spaces and the
knock-on effects on their own value chains. In conducting this analysis we
have sought to bring together three different strands of literature that have
remained disconnected: The work on investment-centred value chains within
MNCs (Chen 2008; Hobday and Rush 2007; Marin and Bell 2010; Saliola and
Zanfei 2009); the literature on developing country firms in trade-centred global
value chains (Ernst 2008; Giuliani et al. 2005; Morrison et al. 2008, Schmitz
2007); and the capability-centred work on developing country firms (Bell 1984;
Ariffin and Figueiredo 2006; Figueiredo 2006). The ODIP framework provides
a way of bringing these literatures together.
z Making the ODIP typology work. The findings can be grouped,
distinguishing between internal ODIP (within the decomposing organisation)
and external ODIP (delegating innovation functions to other organisations).
We also distinguish between innovation functions that are either loosely or
closely connected with production functions. This ODIP typology (proposed 
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by Schmitz and Strambach 2009) is used for summarising the findings in
Table 9.1. 
z Big change in innovation closely connected with production. As shown in
Table 9.1, ODIP types 2 and 4 dominated. Organisational decomposition and
geographical relocation occurred in innovation activities that were tightly
connected to production activities. The Brazilian part of the global auto value
chain is engaged in product and process design, not only for local or regional
markets but increasingly also for global markets. When design problems arise
in the course of ongoing new product development, they are tackled by
subsidiaries or national suppliers in Brazil. In the software industry, lead firms
offshore not only programming tasks, but also important elements of product
and services development, including high-level systems development. 
z Less change in innovation loosely connected with production. ODIP
types 1 and 3 were less frequent and significant. In the auto industry, lead
firms tend to keep corporate research units in the USA and Europe. In
particular, the synthesis and integration of different knowledge domains –
essential for defining technologies of the future – tend to stay in the USA and
Europe. However, subsidiaries and national suppliers have engaged Brazilian
universities in conducting research on new materials and products. In the
Indian software industry, the subcontracting of local research centres is less
common.
Table 9.1 ODIP types in the Brazilian auto and Indian software industries
Internal – External
Connection Intra-firm Inter-firm
between 
production 
and innovation
Loosely connected Type 1 Type 3
Decentralising research Commissioning research 
departments; strengthening from specialised firms, 
dispersed Centres of Excellence universities or other 
in research and experimental organisations, contracting 
development; deepening new technology development 
subsidiaries’ existing Type 2 from specialised R&D 
mandates to encompass organisations, collaborating 
advanced product and process with competitors in technology
engineering development ‘clubs’
Moderate but growing in both Moderate but growing in 
cases. autos and weak but gaining 
traction in software. 
Closely connected Type 2 Type 4
Delegating to subsidiaries Engaging suppliers of 
mandates for the improvement products and services or 
or development of new products specialised consultants to 
and processes; dispersing upgrade, develop and design 
internal centres of design new products or to contribute 
or engineering excellence to process engineering 
Strong in both cases. Strong in both cases.
Source: Authors’ own fieldwork.
IDS RESEARCH REPORT 73
74
z Replication of ODIP within the new powers. Inter-continental ODIP has
country-internal knock-on effects. This is clearest in the Brazilian auto industry.
Brazilian subsidiaries which received an innovation mandate from their
European headquarters, then farmed out part of the innovation process to
their national Brazilian suppliers. National suppliers – engaged in product
innovation for world markets – collaborate with Brazilian universities in
research on specific new materials or processes. The inclusion of these
country-internal knock-on effects was one of the reasons why we could record
new divisions of labour in the innovation process which are not recorded in the
previous literature. 
z What about strategic innovation? In order to ascertain whether ODIP
extended to activities that were strategic for the lead firms we made the
distinction between problem solving and problem framing. The dispersal of
innovation capabilities to firms in Brazil and India occurs mainly in problem-
solving functions. Problem-framing capability is less mobile and tends to
remain in the old powers. In other words, the new opportunities for foreign and
national suppliers in Brazil and India remain bounded by the strategic
concerns of corporate headquarters. However, the lead firms unintentionally
set forces in motion that are beyond their control. In the course of dealing with
advanced problem solving, some Indian software suppliers acquire
capabilities for problem framing in technical fields which some US lead firms
are beginning to draw upon. This means that earlier suggestions that the lead
firms in global value chains will retain the strategic innovation functions
(Schmitz 2007) need to be revised. We found that suppliers have acquired
expertise that lead firms used to consider strategic. Clearly ‘strategic’ is a
slippery concept, definable only by the lead firm. Nevertheless it is meaningful
to record that – in the software industry – the lead firms’ strategic core lies
increasingly in non-technical areas and customer-facing functions. 
z Contingencies. The most innovative firms in both industries had two features
in common. They had substantial histories of technological learning and
continued to make substantial internal innovation-focused investments in
people, organisation, relationships and equipment. This enabled them to
capture the opportunities opened up by ODIP. Hence we do not suggest that
innovative capability is an automatic outcome of ODIP. Far from it. There are
contingent factors which determine whether the opportunities for dispersal
opened up by ODIP are transformed into dispersing realities. 
z Reverse causalities? The causal connection between ODIP in the old
powers and increase of innovation capabilities in the new powers is not one
way. The increasing accumulation of innovation capabilities in the new powers
increases the possibilities for further rounds of ODIP in the old powers. It is,
however, difficult to pinpoint where the whole process started. As stated
above, the first round of ODIP was preceded by the accumulation of initial
innovation capabilities in the rising powers. Whatever the starting point, a
dynamic is underway of decomposing and recomposing innovation processes
in the course of which major geographical shifts of innovation capabilities take
place. 
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9.2 Reflecting on the future
The future evolution of ODIP and its implications for the build-up of innovation
capabilities in the rising powers will depend on a multitude of factors which affect an
increasingly complex and integrated global economy. Thus, it can only be a matter
of speculation. Yet, considering the set of variables and determinants which have
been addressed in this report, one could picture two polarised scenarios.
The first scenario is co-evolution of the old innovating regions in Europe and the
USA and the new innovating regions in Brazil and India. Changes in one bring
about changes in the other and vice versa. The division of labour changes, their
specialisation profiles change but both move forward. The process is painful but
the result is win-win. In this scenario, it is possible that the division of labour and
specialisation will be more pronounced not only within sectors, but also between
sectors. 
Within the two sectors which we have investigated, it could well be that MNC’s
subsidiaries and local suppliers in Brazil and India will increase their role in ODIP
types 1 and 3, that is, increase their function as providers of new technologies and
raise their problem-framing capability. Such new innovation activities are likely to be
concentrated in the technology and knowledge domains in which engineering and
science in the new powers are particularly strong: materials science and biofuels
engineering in the Brazilian auto industry, and exploration of new software
languages in India. Further investments in these fields can provide the means for
effective problem framing and solutions in the future.
In this first scenario, lead firms located in the old powers will draw heavily on their
science power in order to lead major breakthroughs and industry rejuvenation. A
good example in point, for the automotive industry, is the experimentation with
electric vehicles, which has been pushed by lead firms and governments in the
USA and Europe. Making such vehicles viable and developing the required
infrastructure will depend on breakthrough technological and institutional
innovations. Lead firms and governments are investing in such innovations not
only for the sake of curbing CO2 emissions, but also because they envisage a new
frontier of economic and technological leadership. 
The second scenario also stresses intense interaction but the result is that one side
loses and the other one wins. The loser is the old region which sees a decline in
innovation jobs and economic prosperity. The winner is the new region which sees a
rise in innovation jobs and prosperity. ODIP plays a critical role in this process.
ODIP leads to a hollowing out of the innovation capabilities of the old regions and a
corresponding deepening of innovation capabilities in the new regions. In other
words, by embarking on ODIP, the old regions are digging their own grave. 
This scenario is less likely to happen, if we see the future as an extrapolation of
the past. However discontinuity and rupture seem more likely. The economic
stagnation and the political paralysis in most of North America and Western
Europe contrasts with the economic growth and gain in confidence in the rising
powers. Such diverging growth trends are bound to affect the location of
innovation. Markets are predicted to remain flat in the old powers and grow in the
new powers. We know that lead markets have a big impact on where innovation
happens and what it is focused on. The sheer capability to invest in innovation is
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high and rising in the new powers, in both the public and private sectors. This
contrasts with the high public indebtedness in the old powers and the patchy
investment capacity in its private sectors. So from both an investment-push and a
market-pull point of view, the new powers may be gaining and the old powers may
be losing. 
Only time can tell which of these scenarios captures real developments. It could
be that neither prevails and that the outcome is highly differentiated, varying a
great deal between sectors. This does not mean that everything is uncertain. It is
clear from this study that ODIP benefits the rising powers. What is not clear is
whether and where the old powers suffer as a result. Perhaps the biggest winners
are the globalised firms which originate in the old powers but locate their
innovation activities increasingly in the new powers.
77
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